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8INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with a discussion of the
importance of the petroleum industry to our national and
world economy in relation to conditions of peace and war.
During peace times, as well as war times, the
petroleum industry is of major importance in our national
economy. It is one of our newest industries and also one of
our largest. Due to the fact that it is dependent upon an
exhaustable natural resource for its basic supplies, it be-
comes imperative to make an analysis of the various sources
of supply of crude petroleum, their present production and
future possibilities, the rate of consumption in relation to
supplies, the estimated reserves remaining in the United
States, and the number of years they will supply our needs.
Prom the standpoint of the world at war, the petro-
leum industry becomes even more important. The effectiveness
of our present military machine is dependent upon adequate
supplies of oil, a condition which has guided the military
tactics and strategy of the warring nations.
In addition to the peace and war-time problems of
supply and demand the petroleum industry is also confronted
with three other major problems. These are, first, the prob-
lem of transportation of the products; secondly, the increas-
ing burden of taxation which is borne by the industry and the
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9consumers of petroleum products; and third, the problem of
conservation of existing supplies of crude • It is my pur-
pose to show the peace time problem, the solution that was
developed, and then to indicate how the problems have been ag-
gravated by the war demands and how it has been necessary to
devise new solutions.
In writing this report I have tried to develop the
subject on the basis of the three following objectives. First,
to provide an historical review of the economic growth of the
industry so as to establish a basis of understanding for the
reader; secondly, to bring the growth of the industry and its
importance in our national economy as near up to date as pos-
sible; and third, to analyze the effects of the increased and
changing demands of the war upon the various problems of the
industry and to determine how the solutions to the war prob-
lems will affect the post-war industry.
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I. HISTORY
A* Historical Development Of The Petroleum Industry
1. What Is Petroleum?
Petroleum Is one of the oldest natural products
used by man. Literally the word means rock oil from the
Greek petra meaning rock and oleum meaning oil. Technically,
it is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons and their sulphur,
nitrogen, and oxygen derivatives. The carbon-hydrogen ratio
is in varying proportions from 84 to 87 percent carbon and
11 to 13 per cent hydrogen. Oxygen, nitrogen, and sulphur
are common impurities totaling from 1 to 4 per cent. (1)
The molecular arrangement of the carbon and hydrogen is com-
plex and varies with every oil. (E) These variations in
chemical composition result in many physical differences, eg.,
color, specific gravity, and electrical conductivity. Most
oils look black at the first glance, but only the heavier as-
phalt oils are really black. The others are greenish or straw
colored. (3)
Petroleum, as we know, is found in the earth but
how it originated is a problem that has been baffling scientists
(1) Hager, Dorsey, "Fundamentals Of Petroleum Industry",
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1939, p S3
(E) Ibid, p S3
(3) Ball Max W. "This Fascinating Oil Business", Bobbs
Merrill Company, 1941, p S4
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for many years. There are two widely accepted theories of
the origin of oil. One, the inorganic theory, which con-
tends that inasmuch as it is possible to form hydrocarbons
by the reactions of water with metallic carbides, petroleum
may have been formed in the earth by chemical reactions in
connection with great volcanic disturbances. (1)
The second, or organic theory, holds that remains
of plant and animal life—organic materials—buried with
the rocks are the true source of petroleum and natural gas;
that the essential elements of hydrogen and carbon result
from these remains. (2)
It is not our purpose here to go into any detail
as to how the scientists believe the petroleum was formed.
We know that it exists and we know the two most widely accepted
theories as to how it originated. An interesting peculiarity
concerning the distribution of petroleum is that it is not
now in the same place where it was formed, since oil has a
tendency to migrate or travel from its source. Shales and
limestones containing petroleum "source material" are rela-
tively compact and impervious. However, oil is found mainly
in porous rocks and sands which are so porous as to hold con-
siderable quantities of liquids and gases.
These porous rocks and sands, therefore, tend to form
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum Indus-
try", 1935, p 4
(2) Ibid, p 4
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natural reservoirs for petroleum. The reservoirs vary in
size according to the way the sand or rock has been broken,
the size of slab, pebbles or particles, and the manner in
which they are packed in the earth.
As for the general distribution of petroleum, it
has been found on every continent but not all discoveries
have been worthy of development.
2. Primitive Developments
It is possible that a good many people today have
the mistaken idea that petroleum was first discovered in
Pennsylvania and before that time it was unknown. According
to history, petroleum was accidentally discovered by primitive
man. There is evidence that oil, and natural gas seeping to
the earth’s surface furnished fuel for the fire which primi-
tive man worshiped.. The construction of the tower of Babel
and the coating of Noah’s Ark involved the use of a substance
similar in its base to the crude petroleum of today. (1)
Numerous legends indicate that the Greeks recognized
the usefulness of oii. It was used as an instrument of war-
fare in that its fire destroyed enemy property.
Thus the usage of petroleum in the ancient world
was as varied as the countries that were aware of its exist-
ence. It provided primitive man with a source of light, a
means of warfare, and its mysterious properties became for
him an object of worship.
(1) Weaver, Robert B., "Men and Oil", University of Chicago
Press, 1939, p 6
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3. Early Growth Ox Industry
The growth of the petroleum industry has been a
very rapid one in the United States. As we have seen, it
first began in 1859 with the Drake discovery in Pennyslvania.
The primary reason for seeking to commercially develop this
product was that at that time kerosene was made from the crude
petroleum and this kerosene was used for illumination. This
demand for kerosene was the principal one for fifteen years,
that is, up to 1074. Then this demand was augmented by a de-
mand for petroleum lubricants as industrial machinery came
into use. By the end of 1889 or thirty years after its dis-
covery, the American public was using and demanding petroleum
for fuel oil, for power, and for heating purposes.
Next came the development of the internal combus-
tion engine and the first automobile, and the airplane be-
tween 1889 and 1904, which created uses for gasoline. Gas-
oline previously had been a waste product of petroleum. The
demand was further increased with the World War and its ex-
tensive mechanization of the nation's armed forces. The need
for rapid transportation of men, munitions and materials,
enormously increased the use of fuel oil by railroads and
ships. From 1918 to the present date new demands have been
constantly growing and the petroleum industry has been striv-
ing to keep abreast of them. In most cases the petroleum
industry has been more than successful. Even at the present
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time the petroleum industry is being called upon to furnish
the raw material necessary for the production of synthetic
rubber.
Thus the petroleum industry has developed and grown
more rapidly than any other industry. In 1859 the American
petroleum industry consisted chiefly of Drake's well but in
1940 there were approximately 390,000 operating wells which
were producing better than 3,500,000 barrels daily, (1)
These figures demonstrate Just how great the development in
the production of petroleum has been in the past three-fourths
of a century,
4, Drilling Practices
In order to make the above mentioned growth possible
it was neoessary for the production techniques to keep up with
the new and varied demands. To meet these increased demands
it was necessary for the petroleum industry to provide more
adequate means of drilling for oil, which the petroleum indus-
try did. Everyone realized that it would be necessary to go
more than sixty feet into the earth’s surface to obtain all the
oil contained there-in.
There are two methods of drilling* the percussion
or "cable system", and the "rotary" system. Percussion drill-
ing, originally developed by Drake and commonly installed in
the United States, is the standard or cable system. The latter
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 82
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consists of a standard derrick on a rig built of wood or steel,
approximately 80 feet in height. Oil workers call the drilling
equipment a "string of tools", (1) The tools are raised and
dropped at regular intervals, their weight giving the stroke
great force. At the bottom is a pointed bit which literally
punches a hole in the earth. During operations, the hole is
lined with strings of easing which are really lengths of pipe
threaded or welded together. They line the hole drilled into
the earth so that water may be excluded and the sides prevented
from caving.
A newer method of drilling is the rotary system.
Here the drill is not driven into the earth by sheer force,
but revolves augur fashion chewing its way down. The rotary
system utilizes a higher derrick, sometimes as high as 180
feet. This extra height is necessary in order to facilitate
the long lengths of pipe which are used in drilling. As the
depth of the well increases, new lengths of drill pipe are
added. The bit is secured to the end of the drill pipe. When
these bits become dull it is necessary to haul up all the sec-
tions of the pipe, disconnect them one by one, stand them be-
side the derrick until the last section is reached which ha3
the bit attached to it.
This type of drilling is very flexible in that it
is possible to drill wells to almost unbelievable depths. The
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum In-
dustry", 1935, p 34
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depth of the well is limited by the supply of drill pipe, the
drilling conditions of the earth, and the cost of drilling.
The cost of a cable-tool outfit is much less than
that of a rotary outfit. A complete string of cable-tools
may cost from $10,000 to $20,000; a heavy-duty rotary outfit
may cost from $40,000 to $100,000. (1)
Rotary drilling also costs more per day than cable-
tool drilling. In most formations, however, rotary drilling
is faster than cable-tool drilling, so that the actual total
cost of drilling per well may be less with rotary than with
the cable-tool system. (2)
What these two methods of drilling have accomplished
can be seen from the following statistics on the depth of wells.
In 1869 when Drake’s well was the entire American petroleum
Industry, the unheard of well depth was 69 feetj However, in
1940, wells had been drilled to the depth of 16,000 feet, and
the average depth of well for the entire United States was
3,000 feet. (3)
Nevertheless, this progress in drilling methods would
not have been of much practical value if the methods of deter-
mining the location for a new well had not improved also. It
is one thing to be able to drill a hole 15,000 feet deep but
(1) Ball, Max W. ’’This Fascinating Oil Business”, Bobbs,
Merrill Company, 1940, p 99
(2) Ibid, p 104
(3) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures”, Seventh Edition, 1941, p 86
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it is another to know you are going to strike an oil pool with
that drilling.
5. New Methods Of Location
The common practice years ago was called "wild cat-
ting”. No intensive studies were made to determine whether
or not conditions were suitable for oil deposits. Wells were
drilled as test operations in heretofore undeveloped areas
and much was laid to chance. Although we are not too far
evolved from this stage today, there have been scientific ad-
vances made which make the possibility of discovering oil
more probable.
The greater part of this work is done by geologists
who try to map the sub-strata of the earth and determine the
location of the deposits, i'he methods involved are numerous
and highly technical but worthy of brief consideration.
One method employed by the geologists is that of a
core drill or an electric recording drill. The oore drill is
used to bring samples of the sub-strata to the surface so they
can be studied as to formation and the possibilities for oil.
The electric recording machine also drills into the earth but
instead of recovering a core it measures the electrical resist-
ivity of the rock being drilled. The resistivity varies for
different rocks, and from the resistivity data the elevations
of the various strata of sandstones, shales, coal beds, and
other rocks may be determined. In this way a fairly accurate
map can be made of the underground constitution.
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If the geologist is unable to determine the presence
of petroleum by either of these means, then he will probably
turn to his newest ally, geophysics.
Geophysics is the application of certain familiar
physical principles - magnetic attraction, the pull of gravity,
speed of sound waves, the behavior of electrical currents -
to the science of geology.
One type of electrical device has already been dis-
cussed. However, some methods are used where no drilling is
needed. One of these methods is the placing of a number of
electrodes in the earth at intervals of a few hundred or a
thousand feet and a current is passed through them and the
intervening rocks. The relative resistance encountered between
different points determines the type of rock strata encountered.
Other means are the measuring of magnetic forces of various
rocks. The geophysicist uses a "magnetometer” in this opera-
tion. It registers the intensity of the magnetic attraction
with minute accuracy and allows the scientists to determine
what types of rock make up the sub- surface.
Another common method is the making and measuring
of small earthquakes. The earth is shocked by well placed
charges of dynamite. The principle is simple. The tremors
travel through some kinds of rock faster than through others.
Some rocks transmit them readily and reflect back only a
small part; others, and particularly limestones, transmit a
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much smaller and reflect back a much larger proportion. When
the reflected waves are small, the downward traveling waves
can be assumed to be passing through good transmitters such
as shales and sandstones; when strong waves come back to the
surface they indicate that the down moving waves have encoun-
tered a reflecting surface. By this means the geophysicist
is to determine the underground formation.
Perhaps the newest means of determining the presence
of oil deposits is the soil analysis method. The theory of
this system is that small quantities of gas escape from tinder-
ground deposits and make their way to the surface. When they
reach the surface they are dissipated into the air, leaving
behind on the surface soil, minute quantities of wax that they
have carried up. An analysis of the soil will reveal whether
or not there are oil deposits near.
Although these are not all the new methods employed
in determining favorable oil formations, they are the most
important. As to the chances of success of these methods, the
following statistics are offered. In 1939, 2,242 wells were
drilled, of which 1,663 were based on geology, including geo-
physics, and 579 were drilled for other reasons. Of the 1,663
based on geology, 1,362 were dry and 301 were producers. Of
the 579 drilled for other reasons, 535 were dry, and 44 were
producers. Geology scored 18.09 per cent of hits, other rea-
sons only 8.22 per cent. Geology showed more than double
the chances for success, but the odds are still about five
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and a half to one against finding a producer. (1)
The foregoing has shown how the petroleum indus-
try is advancing in the technique of locating new fields and
in drilling. However, this constitutes only a part of the
advances made.
The brunt of the burden of development of the
petroleum industry has rested with the part of the petroleum
industry which manufactures the finished product from the
crude petroleum. The refineries have made one of the great-
est contributions of engineering effort to the progress of
civilization and to the welfare and comfort of our citizens.
At first kerosene was the only product that was
used and this was supplied by the refineries. Gasoline was
only a by-product, but the internal-combustion engine came
into use only after the refining industry had provided a
satisfactory fuel.
The intemal-combusion engine has since become the
basis of the present mechanization of agriculture with over
6,000,000 farm motor vehicles and 1,000,000 tractors; other
than steam, it is also the basis of our transportation system,
as it is used in airplanes, trucking facilities, private
transportation, and in diesel powered trains and ships. (2)
Every wheel that turns, and every machine that oper-
ates is evidence of the highly effective and unpretentious
(1) Ball, Max B., "This Fascinating Oil Business", Bobbs,
Merrill Company, 1941, p 82
(2) American Petroleum Industry, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 178
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service the refining industry renders. (1)
In addition to these numerous services already
developed, the refining industry is spending approximately
10 to 12 million dollars per year for research. (2)
B. Technological Developments
1. What Is A Refinery?
A refinery is the factory where the crude oil is
changed into products which are in public demand. There is
no use for the raw crude as it comes out of the ground. It
must be separated into its different component parts and this
is the job of the refinery. But the role of the refinery is
greater than this definition would lead us to believe,
2. Functions Of The Refining Industry
The function of the refining industry in relation
to the entire petroleum industry has been outlined as follows
by the American Petroleum Institute:
1. "To cooperate to the fullest extent with the petroleum
industries
1
efforts to conserve the nation’s crude
supply through the reduction of operating losses,
flexible operations, increasing yields and utilization
of by-products.
2. To convert crude oil into all the finished products
the market requires.
3. To improve continually the quality and increase the
variety of these products, so as to provide the con-
suming public with the highest attainable standard.
(1> American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum
Industry", 1935, p 80
(2) Ibid, p 81
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4. To cooperate with allied industries by manufacturing
such products as they need to develop and improve the
internal combustion-engine and industrial machinery,
5. To anticipate, and to be prepared for an increased de-
mand for its products - caused by economic conditions
or national emergency - by providing adequate manufac-
turing facilities, developing new processes, and improv-
ing efficiency in operations,
6. To provide employment, as steady as possible, to its
workers under safe and sanitary working conditions," (1)
Now we shall see how this vital industry has grown.
3, History Of Refineries
The first refineries in the United States were in
the business of distilling coal for illuminating oil. In
1859, at the time of Drake's discovery, there were about 50
to 60 of these small refineries. When Drake discovered oil,
these small refineries were quick to shift their operations
from the refining of coal to the refining of crude oil.
In 1859 we had 78 operating refineries in th6
United States. (2) However in 1869 this number had jumped to
170. The oil strikes tended for many new operators to come
into the field but by 1879, ten years later, the number had
dropped to 86, This failure of half the refineries was be-
cause of the uncertain supply of petroleum. At that time,
numerous wells were drilled but provided only a small amount
of oil and then had to shut down.
Prom 1880 on however, refining continued to grow,
on one hand, as the demand for refined products increased,
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum Indus-
try", 1935, p 84
(2) Ibid, p 67
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and on the other, as new uses and new products were developed.
In 1940 we had a total of 461 operating refineries distrib-
uted over 36 states and having a refining capacity of 4,196,694
barrels of crude oil per day, (1)
Naturally, as the number of refineries and their
capacity increased, the investment in the refining industry
likewise increased. By the end of 1937, the investment in
the refining division of the petroleum industry was approx-
imately $3,700,000,000 which represented one-third of the
total invested capital in the entire petroleum industry, (2)
The preceding paragraphs are intended as an eco-
nanic discussion of the refining industry, to reveal its im-
portance and functions. Now for a brief consideration of
the more technical aspects of the industry,
4, Refining Techniques
The refining industry has utilized two principles
in securing the different component parts of crude oil. These
two principles are known as the heating method and the crack-
ing method.
In the heating method the crude oil is heated, and
since the different constituents of the oil boil at different
temperatures, the various products may be secured from the
crude by successive boilings. This method is decreasing in
importance because of its relative inefficiency in the face
fl) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts And Fig-
ures”, Seventh Edition, 1941, p 99
(2) Ibid, p 178
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of the newer cracking process.
The principle of operation of the cracking process
is that when oils are subjected to higher temperatures, the
groups of atoms of some of the larger molecules crack and re-
form themselves into other molecules. Various ranges of mole-
cules can be cracked so that they will fit into other ranges.
For example, molecules which are in the kerosene range can be
cracked into molecules which form the gasoline range.
By this method it is possible to a greater extent
to secure that type of product which is in greatest demand.
Before the cracking process was used the gasoline recovery
from a barrel of crude was about 18 per cent; today it aver-
ages 48 per cent. (1) If it were not for this process the
wells of the United States could not produce enough crude oil
to meet our gasoline consumption. The refining techniques
are basically the same for all the products which are derived
from crude oil. It is not possible to make any clear cut
distinction as to the different types of refining processes
used to secure different products.
5. Octane Numbers
The most important development in gasoline refining
has been the securing of gasoline with a high octane rating.
This has been accomplished by utilization of the cracking
(1) Ball, Max W. "This Fascinating Oil Business", Bobbs,
Merrill Publishing Company, 1941, p 206
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process which secures a higher grade of gasoline and the
mixing of other products with gasoline. In order to appre-
ciate this development it will be necessary to understand
the meaning of the term "octane”.
Octane numbers are a unit of measurement which
indicates the tendency of a particular fuel to knock. This
octane number rating is obtained by taking a fuel of unknown
value and comparing it to a fuel of known value that is based
upon blends of iso-octane and normal heptane. These two prod-
ucts are selected because of their wide difference in knock-
characteristics. Arbitrarily sin octane number of 100 is
assigned to iso-octane and an octane number of zero Is applied
to normal heptane. These two fuels are blended and tested in
live motors. The blend is adjusted in accordance with its
tendency to knock and when a suitable fuel has been obtained
by mixing 70 parts iso-octane and 30 parts normal heptane the
fuel is rated at 70 octane.
Because of the development of this high octane fuel,
the army airplanes are today developing about a third more
horse-power per cubic inch of piston displacement than they
were able to do with gasoline prior to 1928. This increased
power has improved flying speed, take-off, and climb, and
has made the performance of the TJ. S. military airplane out-
standing. (1) It has also permitted a decrease in fuel
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum
Industry", 1935, p 104
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consumption, which is essential for long distance flying;
such ventures as Jimmie Doolittle ! s raid upon Tokio was cer-
tainly made possible by the development of high octane gasoline.
6. Viscosity of Lubricating Oils
In relation to the further refining of the once re-
fined crude products, there comes the problem of additional
refining of lubricants. A lubricant cannot be used as such
when it is first separated from the crude. The following three
steps must be completed in the manufacture of lubricating oils.
1. Fractionation or separation of the lubricating-oil
content into a large number of different kinds and
grades of oil.
2. Removal of wax (dewaxing).
3. Removal of undesirable constituents (asphalt carbon,
and sludge forming hydrocarbons).
It is not necessary to go into the methods of accomplishing
these three steps. It is enough that we know they are neces-
sary. However, after these steps have been accomplished, there
is another which tends to increase some desirable character-
istics of lubricating oils. This is acquired by the addition
of certain special products to the lubricating oil to make the
oil conform to S. A. E. (Society of Automotive Engineers)
Standards. These will modify the viscosity of the lubricant
to keep the lubricant fluid at low temperatures.
The viscosity of an oil is its resistance to shear
or flow, and is measured by the rates of flow of oil; spe-
cifically, the time, measured in seconds, in which 60 cc of
oil empties from a standard chamber through a standard orifice.
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Thus, we have seen in a general way, the develop-
ment of the industry, and the techniques, and the processes of
refining. The discussion of refining would not be complete
without mention of the percentage of yields of refined products
from the run of crude to the refineries.
7. Percentage of Yields of Various Refined Products from
Crude ~ Oil
The percentage of the various products recovered
from a barrel of crude has changed quite rapidly since 1914
to comply with the change in consumer demands. In 1914 the
percentage of yields of the various products from a barrel of
crude were distributed as follows: gasoline - 19$; kerosene -
25$; lubricants - 4$; gas and fuel oil - 46$; and miscellane-
ous products - 6$. These figures show that the greatest
demands for oil were for lighting, heating, and power. The
demand for gasoline was minor in comparison to kerosene and
fuel oil. However, by 1940 the percentage of yields from a
barrel of crude had changed to read as follows: gasoline -
45.7$; kerosene - 5.7$; gas and fuel oil - 38.6$; lubricating
oils - 2.8$; and miscellaneous products - 9.2$. The use of-
the automobile and airplane had become more universal and the
demand for gasoline had increased with a resulting decrease in
percentages of other products secured from a barrel of crude.
The refining industry has kept pace with the public demand
and has done so efficiently, as we shall see in the discussion
of conservation
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C. Marketing
1. Definition of Marketing Function
The physical plant engaged in the distribution of
petroleum is spread over the entire country and consists of
specialized transportation facilities, intermediate ware-
houses, and retail establishments. The last named are either
service stations devoted to the sale of this commodity and
related accessories, or establishments of various sorts that
handle petroleum products as a side line.
The marketing function of the petroleum industry
begins when the finished products move from the refinery to
terminals or bulk stations. This move is accomplished by
utilization of the various transportation facilities the indus
try has at its disposal. The terminals are large depots
located in relation to the system of servicing that is in-
volved. Terminals are located on the sea board for receiving
of supplies delivered by tankers and are also located inland
to secure supplies delivered by pipe lines and railroads.
Bulk stations are wayside storage stations, comprising a few
tanks, a loading rack, and other facilities usually located
within trucking distance of retail outlets.
2 . Retail Distribution
The retail facilities of distribution of the petro-
leum industry are the part of the industry that has developed
most rapidly and has been characterized by rapid changes.
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Prior to the use of gasoline the petroleum industry
had built up a system of marketing kerosene by means of tank
wagon delivery from door to door. This facility was avail-
able when gasoline came into use and was utilized from the
beginning. In 1907 an enterprising American saw the possi-
bilities of establishing a business for the sole purpose of
servicing automobiles, thus establishing the first retail
outlet.
The increasing use of the automobile and other gaso-
line motors speeded the development of this type of service.
The major oil companies started building service stations,
but their capital structure would not permit them to build as
rapidly as it was necessary to supply the increasing demands.
It was at this time that the oil companies employed independent
owners to handle their products for them. The demand for
dealers soon outran the immediate supply and the oil companies
began to compete with each other to secure dealers. Extra
inducements were offered in the form of increased margins and
also free pumps and other equipment.
These inducements were necessary to a certain degree
to insure the growth of the system but they also tended to
subsidize the dealers and jobbers needlessly. The result was
that increasing numbers of retail outlets were opened even
though the increase in sales did not warrant the increase in
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operators. This resulted in a decrease in unit sales, which
pushed operating costs up and brought on the pressure for
legislation to set margins so that all operators would be in-
sured of adequate returns on their investment.
Such legislation has not been adopted and should not
be, since the truly economic solution to the problem is to al-
low the narrow margins to retard expansion and permit volume
sales per unit to increase.
3. Number Of Retail Outlets
As we have seen the first service station was start-
ed in 1907. By 1920 there were some 15,000 service stations
in operation. The next ten years, between 1920 and 1930,
showed the greatest increase in the number of stations in op-
eration. The increase in filling stations, the total sales
for all service stations and the per unit sales are shown on
the following table.
Table 1
Trend Of Increase In Service Station Operators
Total Retail Sales And Per Unit Sales
(1929-1939)
Year Operators Total Sales Per Unit Sales
1929. . . 121,513 $1,787,423,000 $14,700.00
1933. . . 170,404 1,532,000,000 9,000.00
1935. . . 197,568 1,967,714,000 9,950.00
1938. . . 226,000 2,404,000,000 10,630.00
1939, . . 241,586 2,822,481,000 11,700.00
Source
:
Petroleum Pacts
p 144
and Figures, Seventh Edition, 1941,
This table indicates that since 1933 the marketing
system of the petroleum industry has been tending toward the
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point of efficiency* Per unit sales are increasing as the
demand for gasoline and other petroleum products increases
more rapidly than does the construction of new units. How-
ever, there is a question whether per unit sales are high
enough to cover costs of operation and allow a fair rate of
return on the original investment. The table above shows
that per unit sales are increasing but it does not show how
costs of operation have also increased. A vague picture of
the increased costs can be seen from the following table
which shows the trend of average cost of construction of ser-
vice stations for the same period as covered in table one.
Table 2
Trend Of Construction Costs Of New Stations
Year Average Cost Per Unit
1931 $2,703.00
1933 2,310.00
1935 3,047.00
1938
3,559.00
1939
3,843.00
Source: Petroleum Facts and Figures, Seventh Edition, 1941,
p 145
Although statistics are not available which show
the increase in marketing costs per unit over the period 1929
to 1939, I feel safe in assuming the costs of operation have
increased with the operation of super service units. More
help has been necessary, more services have been offered to
the consumer, more advertising has been done and operating
costs in general have tended to increase.
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In addition to the retail service station units
which were compared in the two previous tables there were
also numerous secondary marketing units which handled petro-
leum products. However, they were not considered as service
stations since their sales of petroleum did not make up 50$
of their total sales. These secondary outlets are described
as we shall see in the next table and their numbers for the
years 1935 and 1939 as indicated.
Table 3
Secondary Petroleum Outlets
(1935-1939)
Outlets
:
1935 1939
Oarages and repair shops 73,700 62,486
Motor vehicle dealers 35,000 43,894
Accessory & tire dealers 4,400 5,192
County general stores 24,700 38,530
Other secondary outlets 41.900 45.617
Total Secondary Outlets 179,700 195,719
Source: American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and
Figures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 144
4. Employment In Marketing
The marketing branch of the petroleum industry pro-
vides employment for approximately 747,855 individuals. This
figure is distributed among the various divisions of the mar-
keting branch as follows.
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Distribution Of Marketing Employees
Wholesale Marketing
Proprietors 23,978
Employees 106.875
130,853
Retail Marketing
Proprietors 231,475
Employees 235,527
Indirect employees, estimated- 150,000
617,002
Total Marketing Employees 747,855
Source: American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts and
Figures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 174
These figures represent approximately 66$ of the
total persons employed in the entire petroleum industry. Al-
though it seems to be a tremendous percentage it is easy to
understand when we think of the number of persons employed in
the retail distribution of petroleum products in our own com-
munity. There are service stations and garages in almost ev-
ery block employing from one to several persons each.
5. Retail Prices
In studying the retail prices of a product it is
necessary to ask the question, "Have prices been reasonable
for the product received and the service preformed?" In con-
sidering petroleum products I feel that the answer is yes.
The consumers of petroleum products have received
an increasing amount of service and if we look into the tech-
nological aspects of petroleum products we would see that the
grade of product has increased as new discoveries were
utilized.
During the course of the past twenty years the
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retail price of gasoline has declined more than twofold. The
trend in retail prices of gasoline for fifty representative
cities can be see on this table.
Table 5
Average Retail Gasoline Prices, Sxolusive Of Tax
( 1920- 1940
)
Year Retail price
(cents per gallon)
1920 29.74^
26.11
1922 . 24.82
1923 21.06
1924 19.46
1925 20.09
1929 17.92
1931 12.98
1933 12.41
1935 13.55
1937 14.59
1938 14.07
1939 13.31
1940. 12.75
Source: American Petroleum Industries Committee, "Tax tfoo-
nomics Bulletin", Vol. VII, ITo. 7, October, 1942, p 40
This decrease in price has been the result of two
factors. First, the increase in competition in the petroleum
industry and second, the discovery of increasing supplies of
petroleum which resulted in a condition of overproduction for
many years. The high prices during the World War I and for
the same period immediately following the war were due to the
shortage of supplies. However, it was about this time that
large deposits were discovered in California which relieved
this condition. From that time on increasing discoveries in
Western fields made an oversupply rather than an undersupply.
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6. Retail Outlets Classified As To Type Of Management
The marketing of petroleum products is characterized
by the type of ownership of retail outlets that prevails in the
system. When the marketing system was first developed most of
the retail outlets were company owned and operated. A condition
of rapid expansion made this company ownership impracticable
and it was necessary to seek aid from independent dealers.
The dealers were usually aided in starting their business by
the oil company and the type of contract signed with the com-
pany varied with the amount of assistance given. At the pres-
ent time the retail marketing of petroleum products usually
comes under one of the following ten types of retail outlets.
Types Of Retail Stations:
1. Service station owned and operated on a salary basis by
a marketing company.
a. nationally branded products
b. locally branded products
2. Service station owned by marketing company but leased to
the dealer, who in turn is responsible for all operating
costs, including wages and his own remuneration.
3. The so-called third-party operation, in which the market-
ing company leased land and improved it or leased improved
property and then subleased the service station with im-
provements and equipment.
4. The lease-and-agency service station was an operation in
which the dealer owned the land, improvements, and equip-
ment or may have leased the land and installed the equipment
and improvements. The dealer entered into a written agree-
ment with oil company. One of these was the lease where-
by the station and facilites were leased to the oil com-
pany for a definite period of time. Another instrument
appointed the dealer agent to sell the products of the
supplying company.
5. Lease-and-license stations.
6. Independent dealer owning and operating station with or
without sales contract with the supplier.
7. Trackside service stations.
a. owned and operated by chain organization.
b. individually owned and operated.
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8. Cooperative service stations.
9. Garage service stations.
10.
Marine service stations principally for boats. (1)
In recent years most of the major oil companies
have tended to decrease their direct company owned outlets.
This has been due for the most part to the passage of ohain-
store taxes which were applied to company owned and operated
service stations. This type of tax originated in Iowa and is
known throughout the business world as the "Iowa Plan". In
order to avoid this tax the major oil companies have relied
more heavily on the lease type of service station.
7 , Criticism Of Company Controlled Stations
Although the flow sheet of distribution of petroleum
products shows that only 10% of the marketing of petroleum prod-
ucts is handled through company owned stations, it does not
show that in 1934 approximately 83.2% of the individually op-
erated stations were controlled by the major oil companies
through one of the various contract arrangements. (2) It is
this control that has incited the heaviest criticism of the
petroleum marketing structure.
The major oil companies secure operators to handle
their products by allowing the owner some special concession.
These special concessions usually take one of the following
forms;
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Hearings Before Temporary
National Economics Committee", 1941, p 347
(2) Hearings Before Temporary National Economics Committee,
"Petroleum Industry", Part 15-A, U. S, Government
Printing Office, October 7, 1939, p 1780
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. 1. additional margins on gasoline
2. free equipment
3. free paint jobs on stations
4* free building construction
5. free paving
6. credit extensions
7. advertising allowances
8. bonus plans
9. special discounts
10* cash payments
For these services the owners usually sign a contract with
the oil company which specifies that he must handle the prod-
ucts of the contracting company. It is this particular fea-
ture of the contract that incites the opposition. Individual
operators cannot handle the products which their customers
may demand and this is one of the few examples where a retailer
cannot handle the products that he may wish to.
8 . Methods of Enforcing Control
The oil companies have various methods of enforcing
-control over their service stations. The most common of these
methods are:
1. contract specifies certain conditions, non-
compliance with which provides a threat of
cancellation;
2. threats to cancel any extra margins which the
dealer may enjoy;
3. threats to cancel courtesy cards; the with-
drawal of such cards cancels the dealer’s
right to grant credit to customers. (1)
9 . Petroleum Marketing System From Economic Standpoint
The average consumer of petroleum products is proba-
bly more than satisfied with the petroleum marketing system.
His every wish has been catered to and from the standpoint of
(1) Hearings Before Temporary National Economics Committee,
"Petroleum Industry", Part 15-A, TJ.S. Government,
Printing Office, October 7, 1939, p 8811
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convenience and service the retail marketing system is sur-
passed by none. However, there are numerous criticisms of
the petroleum marketing system which may be made,
First, it is overdeveloped, There are more units
engaged in this business than are necessary to serve the cus-
tomers adequately. Second, the consumer is kept from buying
the product of the independent wholesaler, whose products may
satisfy his wants more adequately than the products of the
major oil companies. Company controlled retail outlets tend
to keep the independent from coming into the market since he
is unable to compete with the major oil companies in securing
retail outlets or advertising his product. His overhead is
lower and he could undersell the major companies if he could
secure the necessary volume.
Third, the control the major oil companies exert
over their service units and their methods of effecting such
control are often criticised, detail dealers are forced to
handle the products specified by their controlling company
and thus cannot handle the brands their customers may desire.
For example, a consumer may desire one brand of gasoline, but
he wants an oil which is manufactured by a different company.
In order to secure these two products he will have to visit
two service stations.
fourth, the methods used in securing increased gallonage
have not always been ethical. Secret rebates are made to cus-
tomers and other inducements offered to increase the volume of
sales
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Although all these criticisms are valid it is a
question whether or not they offset the advantages of company
control. We have seen that the prices of gasoline have tended
to decrease over the past years and in addition to getting a
more economical product the consumer has been getting a higher
grade of product and also a higher grade of service. Whether
or not this service could be rendered more effectively, prices
lowered more, and product qualities increased by the recogni-
tion of the principle of free economics, is the unsolved
question.
The foregoing section has been concerned primarily
with a brief economic history of the development of the petro-
leum industry, and we have considered in greater detail other
aspects of the industry which do not have such an important
position in a paper of this type. This, as you have seen, was
the technological development in the industry. The marketing
structure was also considered briefly in this section. The
industry will be considered in more detail in the following
section, ’’Peace Time Development”, where special emphasis
will be placed on the factors of supoly and demand, and vari-
ous sociological aspects such as employment, wages and stand-
ards of living of the workers. The main purpose of the section
will be to show the economic importance of the industry under
peace time conditions, and its development up to the time of
the second World War.
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II. PEACE THE? DEVELOPMENT OP INDUSTRY
A. Scop© Of Development By End Of 1938
By the end of 1938 the petroleum Industry had be-
come one of the four most important industries in the United
States from the standpoint of investment, being surpassed
only by railroads, agriculture and the combined public util-
ity units. However, in addition to this financial growth
its economic and social importance was of suoh magnitude that
it could not be measured in dollars and cents.
The petroleum industry has contributed more to the
development of the automotive industry than any other factor.
The automobile is no longer a luxury and with its progress
have come good roads and highways and the relative shortening
of distances between cities and rural areas. It has made the
territorial expanse of the United States shrink from weeks
of travel to less than a day.
In addition to the supplying of the country with
motor fuels and lubricants, the industry also supplies the
important basis for such products as asphalt waxes, paints,
gum, medicines, soaps, tires, ink, cosmetics, and more than
300 other products. Some of these products are in use in
every American home every day, every hour, and every minute.
If the petroleum industry with all its by-products should
suddenly cease to exist the American house-hold would find
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it difficult to function until a substitute was developed.
Electricity would soon be halted, since many turbines and
generators are powered by oil, there would be no heat in the
radiators, no gas in the modern range, no plastics on the
knobs of radios and other household appliances, no soap to
wash with, combs and brushes would be gone and no cosmetics
for the ladies dressing table - in fact, it would be decidedly
inconvient and uncomfortable.
The household would not be the principal sufferer.
The 29,000,000 motor vehicles registered in the United States
in 1938 would be brought to a standstill, il) Mr. Average
Citizen would be unable to travel to work. His automobile
would be useless, the busses would cease to run, and part of
the train facilities would be stopped since the majority of
the new locomotives are powered by Diesel motors burning fuel
oil.
.
Our shipping vessels, which in 1938 consumed over
74,000,000 barrels of fuel oil would be forced to cease run-
ning. (2) The manufacturing plants which in the same year
consumed over 60,000,000 barrels would also be forced to
shut down. (3) The United States military forces would be
unable to move.
Is the petroleum industry important to our national
(1) Petroleum Pacts And Figures, Seventh Edition 1941, p 41
(2) Ibid, p 41
(3) Ibid, p 41
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economy? We can see that it is of vital importance. Our
transportation system is dependent entirely upon the petro-
leum industry, our homes are partially governed by its
products and services, and even our health may depend upon
its existence - through its use as a fuel for heat, in the
preparation of food, and as medicine.
B. Size Of Industry By End Of 1938
/9SJ
1 • Number of Operating Companies
The importance of the petroleum industry economi-
cally and socially has been seen by the brief description
given of its general use by the population of the United
States. To the statistically minded person, the capital
investment in the United States in relation to other indus-
tries and the nation as a whole will provide a basis for a
clearer understanding of the importance of the petroleum
industry. By the end of 1938 the oil industry, which con-
/
sisted of some 6,000 oil companies, large and small; and
17
,
10,000 or more individual oil operators and producers 9 were
supplying the American public with approximately 1,112,000,000
barrels of petroleum products and received from them at whole-
sale some $1,963,000,000. (1)
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 237
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2. Capital Investment And Distribution
In order to accomplish this tremendous program of
production and supply the petroleum industry utilized a gross
capital investment of over ^14,000,000,000 which was distrib-
uted in the various branches of the industry as shown on
table 6 on page 43.
Table 6
Net Investment In United States Petroleum Industry
Division
Crude-oil production .
Crude-oil pipe lines .
Marine transportation.
Reiining • • • . . • «
Tank cars
Refined-products pipe lines
Marketing
Segregated adminstrat ion.
Total
Total Per Cent
Investment of Total
16,960,000,000 49 .2$
964,900,000 6.9
432,600,000 3.1
2,248,500,000 15.9
217,500,000 1.5
102,850,000 .7
3,019,000,000 21.3
200.000.000 1.4
$14,135,350,000 100.0$
Source: American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts
and Figures, Seventh Edition 1942, p 178
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These investment figures do not include the foreign
investment of the United States oil companies, which in 1937
was estimated by the United States Department of Commerce to
be about $1, 100,000, 000. (1)
3* Comparison Of Invested Capital To National Invested
Capital And Other Major Industries
This investment represented about five per cent of
total national investment capital which has been estimated to
be about $300,000,000,000*
In relation to the investment in other industries,
the petroleum industry ranks fourth, being outranked by rail-
roads, public utilities and, of course, the total agriculture
investment. In 1935 the investment in the public utility
industry, including gas and electric companies, and telephone
companies, amounted to about $17,300,000,000. The railroads
were estimated as having an investment of over $27,000,000,000.
Accurate statistics as to the total agriculture investment are
not available, but they are estimated to be in excess of the
investment in the railroads. (2)
4 . Growth of Capital Investment Of 25 Major Oil Companies
In Relation To Public Demands And Comparison To 400
Industrial Corporations
A comparison of statistics as to capital investment
of 25 major oil companies in comparison to 400 industrial
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts and
Figures”, 1941, p 178
(2) National Petroleum News, "Guthrie, B. V., Oils Invest-
ment is $13,276,000,000 With Prooerties In Every
State", p 41, 1936
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corporations was completed by the Standard Statistics Com-
pany for the years 1927 to 1938 and showed that the invest-
ment of these 24 oil companies has increased from
$6,248,000,000 to $6,855,000,000, an increase of 9.7 per
cent. In comparison to this, the 400 industrial investment
has increased from $24,566,000,000 to $25,745,000,000, an
increase of 4.8 per cent. This does not indicate such a
high rate of capital investment for petroleum companies in
comparison to other industries. These figures do not in-
dicate the great difference in demands which have been made
upon the two units by the public. In 1938, the demand upon
the group of 400 general industries was 79.2 per cent of
what it had been in 1927, and even in the boom year of 1937
performance by this group was only 2,8 per cent higher than
it had been in 1927. By contrast, in 1938 demands upon the
American petroleum industry were 40.6 per cent greater than
they were in 1927, and in the boom year of 1937 were 42.8
per cent higher than 1927. (1)
5. Conclusion
These figures indicate that even though the caoital
structure of the petroleum industry has increased rapidly
in the past fifteen years, it has not increased as rapidly as
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings Before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 243
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other industries in relation to the demands that have been
made upon them by the public.
C. Employment In The Petroleum Industry
1. Introduction
As a creator of jobs, the petroleum industry has
made a great contribution to the economic strength of America.
It takes the combined efforts of over one million oersons
to run this gigantic industry. If all these people were con-
centrated in one place they would occupy a city the size of
Cleveland, Ohio, and if we include their dependents, which
average three to a worker, their combined numbers would make
make up a city almost as large as Chicago, Illinois.
However, this army of workers is by no means con-
centrated in one city, one state, or even one area of the
United States. There is not one community in America which
does not have at least one representative of the industry
included in its midst. This condition has resulted, of course,
from the widespread use of the automobile and the efforts of
the marketing system of the petroleum industry to serve every
consumer.
2 . Division Of Employment
These millions of workers are distributed through-
out the various branches of the petroleum industry roughly
as indicated in the table on page 47.
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These statistics show that the marketing system
o f the petroleum industry supports about two-thirds of the
total industry employment, This helps us to understand the
reason why the marketing structure is criticized as being un-
economic in that it supports more individuals than is ab-
solutely necessary to render the necessary service to the
consumer of petroleum products.
Table 7
Employment In The Petroleum Industry, 1938 w
Division of Industry
General administrative employees.
Average
ITumber of
Employees
65,000
Percentage
of
Total
05,8%
Drilling and production
Salaried employees
Wage earners
Total drilling and production
155.000
15.000
170.000 15.1%
Petroleum pipe lines
Salaried employees. .....
Wage earners
Total petroleum pipe lines
2,800
23.100
25,900 02.3%
Marine Transportation 15,000 01.2%
Refining
Salaried employees
Wage earners
Other refinery workers ....
Total refiniug
14,745
72,840
13.000
100,585 09.4%
I'Vholesale Marketing
proprietors
toaployees
Indirect Employees
Total retail marketing
Total marketing
Total Petroleum industry employment
231,475
235,527
150.000
617.002
747,855
1,124,340
66.2%
100 %
Source: American Petroleum Institute
,
"Petroleum Facts and
Figures", 1941, p 174
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This table does not show a separate figure for
the number of people employed in automotive transportation
of petroleum products, the majority of which are truckers.
As of 1938 it was estimated by the American Petroleum In-
stitute that there were some 100,000 such individuals. In
the preceding table these persons were in the industry di-
vision in which they work and therefore were not disregarded.
3. Employment Trends - 1929-1938
The trend in employment activity in the production,
refining, and pipe line branches of the petroleum industry
is shown in this table of employment indexes.
Table 8
Employment Indexes
(1929=100)
Petroleum Petroleum Pipe Mfg.
production refining lines industries
1938 72.1 97.2 98.6 81.9
1937 76.5 102.3 90,2 99.8
1936 72.9 97.5 85.5 92.3
1935 74.9 96.0 84.9 86.1
1934 77.7 96.3 79.9 80.8
1933 62.2 85.6 73,1 69.2
1932 55.3 79.3 71.5 62.5
1931 65.7 85.4 78.3 73.7
1930 87.4 100.4 98.6 87.2
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source
:
American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum In-
dustry Hearings Before temporary National Economic
Committee”, 1942
The above indexes show that employment in the three
branches of the industry considered has conformed quite close-
ly to the trend of all manufacturing industries, which is
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governed by the economic conditions of the country. The low
point of employment was struck in 1932 and since that date
there has been a gradual trend upwards. Employment in petro-
leum production has tended to remain quite constant from 1934
on. Petroleum refining and pipe lines have showed increases,
which is due to the increased demand that was placed upon
them by changing conditions. Refiners have been faced with
the problem of meeting a rapidly changing consumer demand and
haw been meeting this demand without an increase in production,
a fact that is very beneficial to our supplies of crude
petroleum.
The trend of employment in the marketing division
is not shown in these indexes. It is in this particular
branch that the major increases in employment have actually
occurred. The number employed in the marketing division has
increased from 447 thousand in 1934 to 748 thousand in 1938;
an increase of about 41 per cent. (1) This tremendous in-
crease is due to the increased use of automobiles, which has
attracted many people into the marketing field. However, as
was mentioned previously, the increase has proved to be un-
economic in the fact that retail activity and sales have not
warranted the number of operators, (2)
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts and
Figures", 1941, p 174
(2) See pages 29-38
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4. Scale of Wages
The petroleum industry T s contribution to the
national welfare cannot be measured in terms of total em-
ployees alone. It must also be considered from the stand-
point of purchasing power supplied to its workers, which
depends upon the weekly earnings of the employees.
In 1938 the average weekly wage for all manu-
facturing industries was $22.84 per capita. (1) The average
weekly wage for petroleum refinery workers was $34.92 and
for production employees $33.94. (2) Of course, these fig-
ures do not have a great deal of importance unless hours
of labor are also considered. It is possible for a weekly
wage to be high, but if the hours worked are long the hourly
wage drops and the comparative wage scale is of no value.
In 1938 the average hourly rate for all manufac-
turing industries was $.646, the average hourly rate for
petroleum production was $.846, and for petroleum refining,
$.979, (3) These figures serve to substantiate the weekly
rates and show that weekly rates were not high merely be-
cause more hours were worked. The petroleum industry main-
tained a wage scale in production and refining which was
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 481
(2) Ibid, p 482
(3) Ibid, p 482
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approximately 43 per cent higher than the average hourly
rate for all manufacturing industries. In the same year the
average weekly rate for pipeline carrier employees was
aporoximat e ly $27.88. (1)
A common criticism of the above statistics is that
the petroleum industry uses a high percentage of well trained
labor and thus pays high wage 3 for skill, while the manufac-
turing industries find it possible to use "common labor".
Rates for the refining industry in comparison to manufactur-
ing industries show that the wage rates are $.634 per hour
for refinery common labor and $.504 for manufacturing labor,
a difference of 13 cents per hour. (2)
Thus, it is possible to see that the petroleum
industry maintains a comparatively high wage scale and because
of these wage rates the workers are able to maintain a high
standard of living. However, in addition to paying higher
wages the petroleum industry offers other advantages which
also make for a favorable standard of living.
5. Qnployee Benefits
One of the outstanding advantages of the worker in
the petroleum industry is continuity of employment, without
seasonal lay-offs, assuring him of dependable annual earnings.
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 486
(2) Ibid, p 484
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Furthermore, the great majority of the employees
in the production, pipe line, and refining divisions enjoy
some or all of such benefits, death benefits, and old-age
pensions; vacation with pay, termination settlements, and in
some cases stock purchase plans.
D. Peace Time Production
1. Total World Production
The production of crude petroleum has increased as
rapidly as necessary to keep abreast of the demand for re-
fined products. As we have seen, this rate of production has
been too rapid in relation to the conservation of crude re-
serves. By the end of 1958 all the major oil producing coun-
tries of the world were producing almost 2,000,000,000 barrels
of crude oil annually. Just how great the demand for crude
petroleum has been can be realized when we see that, in 1938,
of the 2,000,000,000 plus barrels of crude that were pro-
duced in the world, over 1,900,000,000 barrels were consumed,
which means that there was an excess of production over con-
sumption of approximately 160,000,000 barrels. (1)
2. Comparison Of Production By Countries
The countries who have played the most important
part in the tremendous world production can be seen from
(1) American Petroleum Institute, ''Petroleum Facts and
Figures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 17
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the following chart. This shows the number of barrels of
crude produced by the countries in order of their importance
and their percentage of total world production.
Table 9
World Production Of Crude Petroleum
(Figures show millions and tenths
of millions of 42 gallon barrels)
1938
Country production -P'o4-5«HO
United States 1214.3 61.6%
Russia 204.9 10.3%
Venezuela 188.2 9.5%
Netherland East Indies 57.3 2.9%
Rumania 45.6 2.3%
Mexico 38.3 2 . 0%
Iran 32.6 1.6%
Colombia 21.6 1.1%
Argentina 17.1 .9%
Peru 15.8 . 8%
Trinidad 17.7 1.0%
Poland 3.8 .3%
India, British 2.5 .3%
Total 1987.7 Approx. 100. %
Source: World Almanao and Book of Facts, New York World
Telegram, 1942
These figures show that the United States leads
the world in the production of crude petroleum. In fact, it
produces about six times as much as its nearest competitor,
Russia, The high rate of production in the United States is
due to development and not necessarily a more abundant supply
of crude petroleum,
Russia has vast developed and undeveloped oil re-
sources and as a source of supply in years to come, is next
in importance to the United States, In Russia T s future
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industrial expansion, oil will play an important play, as
Russia has the largest untouched reserves of oil as well as
many other minerals.
The next most important source of supply, both at
the present and in the future, is South America. Oil is
found in South America from the northern to the southern
boundaries. Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Argentina, and Ecuador
all have productive oil fields. Venezuela is by far the most
important source at the present, but in time the other areas
of South America should become equally as important as develop-
ment becomes more extensive. Up to 1938 very little prospect-
ing had been done there in comparison to the United States.
In North America, next to the United States, Mexico
looms as an important source of supply. These fields which
are all near the Gulf Coast of Mexico, from Tabasco on the
south to Tampico farther north, have proved to be rich sources
of oil and will probably be of greater importance in the
future since they have not been fully exploited.
3. Production Costs
There is more to producing crude petroleum than
just turning a valve and allowing the oil to flow into a tank.
There are many items which must be considered in determining
the cost of producing the oil.
First, there is the cost of finding the oil, which
includes geological work, the leasing of lands, the payment of
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rentals, and the cost of drilling which includes the cost of
drilling dry holes. Then there is the exoense of equipment
which must be installed. Then comes the cost of labor and
materials used in producing, also the value of the royalty
oil, which the producer pays to the royalty owners.
The average cost of production per barrel varies
from year to year and from district to district, depending
upon the proportion of the production that comes from flush
fields. The latest complete statistics for the production
costs were made in 1934 by the United States Petroleum Adminis-
trative Board and published by the United States Department
of Interior. This report shows the production cost data for
the United States as a whole from 1931 to 1934.
Table 10
Cost of Producing A Barrel of Crude Oil
1931 - 1934
(costs per barrel)
Expenses
:
1931 1932 1933 1934
Depletion
.0942 .081? .079$? .wrsj
Depreciation .16 2 .1522 .1482 ,1432
Amortization of
intangibles, develop-
ment costs
.037$? .0432 .045$? .048$?
Operating costs
. 222<? .213d .207d .2122
General overhead and
administrative costs .347d .246d .276d .267d
Total
. 9482 .7532 .755
2
.7482
Less: Gas sales
and miscellaneous
revenue
.063d .059d .059<? .060$?
Net cost per barrel .7852 .6942 .696 .6892
Source: U. S. Department of Interior, "Preliminary Reoort On
Survey Of Crude Petroleum
”,
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This report shows that the average total cost of
production was about 79.8 cents per barrel for the years
studied. Since 1934 there havebeen no acourate statistics
tabulated by years which would show the trend. We do know
that the cost of production of crude oil has been increasing
due to increased taxes, increased investment per barrel of
oil produced* In 1939 the cost of producing a barrel of crude
oil had risen to about 93.4 cents per barrel* (1)
4* U, S. Refining Capaoity
The number and capacity of refineries have grown
in the United States to keep pace with the increased demands
for refined products* By the end of 1938 there were 431 op-
erating refineries in the United States with a refining ca-
pacity of almost 4,000,000 barrels per day. In addition to
these operating refineries there were also 120 refineries
with a capacity of 380,000 barrels a day which were shut down*
There were ten new refineries under construction, which, when
finished, would have a capacity of £83,000 barrels a day* (2)
5. Percentage Yields Of Refined Products From Crude Oil
In 1938 over 1,000,000,000 barrels of crude were
run through the various refineries in the United States and
their output in the percentage of the various types of refined
(1) Ralphy, Henry D* "Report On production Costs Shows Wide
Disparity Among Fields", January 28, 1943, Oil and
Gas Journal
(2) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 101
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products are shown on the following table, listed in the
order of their importance.
Table 11
Percentage Yields From Crude Petroleum
1938
Gasoline. • • • • • • 44.0%
Fuel Oils • • # • • • 38.0%
Kerosene. • • • • • • • 5,5%
Lubricants • • • • • • • 2.6%
Asphalt • • e • • • • • 2.0%
Coke • • e • • • °.n
Road Oil. • • • • • • • q.H
Miscellaneous
Total
products • • <d.£c/o
100.0%
Compiled by author from U. S. Refinery Production Statistics
given by the American Petroleum Institute
The preceding percentages converted in gallons per
barrel of crude would show that out of every barrel of crude
refined in 1938 wq received 18.6 gallons of gasoline, 2,3
gallons of kerosene, 16.1 gallons of fuel oils and 1,1 gal-
lons of lubricating oil. The remaining four gallons of orude
are divided among the various other products in ratio to the
above percentages.
Refinery outputs have varied a great deal during
the past few years since refineries have kept up with the
public demand in turning out the products most desired. As
we shall see in the discussion of conservation, if the refin-
ing industry had not been able to increase its production
per various products in comparison to total crude run through
the stills it would have been necessary to produce almost
twice as much crude. (1)
(1) See page 1&3
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6. Retail Price Trends
The retail price trends of petroleum products
tended to decline from the period of 1929 to 1935. This
trend in general followed the trend of all retail commodity
prices which fluctuate with the economic conditions of the
nation. Since 1935 the trend in the retail prices has been
increasing slightly up to the end of 1938, which is due to
the cost of production and operating, and then a general
conformity to the trend of all retail prices. The price of
gasoline has varied from 17 cents per gallon in 1929 to
cents in 1935. Prom 1935 the trend has been upward again
and in 1938 the retail price per gallon of gasoline, exclusive
of taxes, was $.1407. The same general trend has occurred
for the balance of the refined petroleum products. Kerosene
prices increased from 7.5 cents per gallon in 1935 to 8.2
cents per gallon in 1938. Retail prices of fuel oils,
lubricants and other petroleum products also followed the
same general trend. To show that these rising prices were
not altogether the result of increased costs in the industry,
I have compared the index trend of retail gasoline prices
with the index of standard of living costs. This comparison
is shown in the following chart.
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Chart 1.
Comparison of Retail Price indexes of
Gasoline and Cost of Living
1931 to 1938
(1923 = 100)
Source: American Petroleum Industry Hearings before Temporary
National Economic Committee, American Petroleum In-
stitute, 1941, p 438
The trend of gasoline prices conforms quite closely
to the cost of living trends except that it does not show such
a great per-centage of decrease between 1931-33. Retail prices
tended to hold quite steady in spite of the depression.
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3. Peace Time Consumption
1. Motor Fuel Demands
As was mentioned in a previous discussion, the use
of petroleum products has become so universal and so much a
part of our daily routines, that if the industry and all its
products were to suddenly cease to exist, not only would the
machinery of the world stop running but it would also be very
inconvenient for us to go about our daily tasks. (1)
In 1938 we had about 30,000,000 motor vehicles reg-
istered in the United States which consumed approximately
465,000,000 barrels of fuel. (2) By 1940 the number of auto-
mobiles had increased to 33,000,000 and the consumption of
fuel had increased to 524,000,000 barrels annually. (3)
2. Comparison To Demand For Other Petroleum Products
Motor fuel is only one of many petroleum products
which are in constant demand by the American public. The
number of barrels of the various petroleum products consumed
and their trend of consumption can be seen by table 11 which
is a comparison of the six years between 1935 and 1940.
(1) See pages 40-41
(2) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 32
(3) Ibid, p 32
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The preceding table shows that the domestic consump-
tion of petroleum products has been increasing quite rapidly
and steadily for the six years compared* However, the larg-
est gains in domestic consumption have been in the consumption
of gasoline, kerosene, and fuel oil. Although the various
other products have shown increases in consumption the degree
of change has not been as marked as the three above mentioned
products
•
What effect does this increased consumption have
upon our reserves of crude petroleum? The answer to this
question has been sought by state and local governments, by men
of the industry and by the consuming public*
3. Effect Of The High Rate Of Consumption Upon Future Supplies
According to estimates made by the American Petroleum
Institute, at the end of 1938 our estimated reserves were
17,348,146,000 barrels of crude. (1) The institute further
estimated that a reserve of this size, not considering any
new discoveries, would last the consuming public about 14.3
years. This is an average figure for the oil fields in the
entire country. Estimated reserves in some states are only
capable of producing enough oil to last us two years while
other states have proven oil reserves that will last for over
19 years. (2) However, by the end of 1940 our estimated re-
serves had increased to some over 19 billion barrels but the
length of time these reserves would supply our nation has not
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures”, Seventh Edition p 74, 1942
(2) Pogue, James E. "Economics of Petroleum Industry”, March,
1939, p 15, Chase National Bank of City of New York
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changed since the consumption of petroleum products has
increased by approximately the same percentage*
4* Production Possibilities Of Untapped Reserves
These are reserves which have already been tapped
and from all indications will produce the estimated amount
of crude* It is practically impossible to estimate the sup-
ply of crude petroleum which has not yet been tapped* It is
possible to determine whether certain geological conditions
of the earth are suitable for oil deposits but to give any
conclusive evidence or even a guess as to the production pos-
sibilities would be fool-hardy* Some estimates have been
hazarded by individuals connected with the petroleum industry*
These estimates place the recoverable oil from untested areas
at approximately 32,000,000,000 barrels in the United States
alone* (1)
5* Proven Reserves In Comparison To Accumulated production
The estimates as to the adequacy of our supplies
of petroleum tend to be slightly pessimistic* A more opti-
mistic view can be obtained by looking at the following chart
of proven underground reserves in comparison to accumulated
production. This chart shows that from the beginnings of
the production of oil the estimated proven reserves have al-
ways been well ahead of accumulated production* At the pres-
ent time our known reserves may be only adequate for about
(1) Hager, Dorsey, "Fundamentals of the Petroleum Industry",
Me-Graw-Hill Book Company, 1938, p 74
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fourteen years but a new discovery may be made tomorrow that
would increase our reserves by several more years supply.
Chart £
Proved Reserves Keep Ahead Of Production
Billion
Barrels
40.93
r
——
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if ‘ - : 4 r i
Proven Underground Reserves
Accumulated Production
'
'
1859 li>14 1940
Source: American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts and
Figures", Seventh 3d it ion, 1942 p 11
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6. Stocks of Petroleum Products
It has been the practice of the petroleum industry
to store most of its excess production capacity right in the
earth. That is, it is not withdrawn faster than it is needed.
Since the newer techniques of production have been discovered
the industry realizes the great advantage of leaving unneeded
oil in the ground and producing it as the demand arises. The
system of proration is built on this principle.
In 1938 the stored stocks of crude petroleum were
some 274,958,000 barrels. By the end of 1940 these crude
( 1 )
oil stocks had fallen about ten million barrels to 264,079,000.
In addition to these stocks of crude petroleum there were also
stocks of refined products which amounted to approximately
240,000,000 barrels and 509,979,000 barrels in 1940.(2)
These stocks divided by average daily consumption
of approximately 4,000,000 barrels daily would show that if
all production was stopped our available produced oil reserves
would only last about 127 days.
7
.
Possible Future Supplies
Although, as has been pointed out before, our proven
reserves will only last about fourteen years at our normal
rate of consumption, there is no widespread alarm as to our
future petroleum supplies. (3) The petroleum Industry
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts and Fig-
ures", Seventh Edition, 1941, p 75
(2) Ibid, p 75
(3) See page 62
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Is confident that as reserves of crude petroleum become
depleted a shift can be made to secure the raw material sup-
plies from coal beds which serve as a base for synthetic
petroleum. In addition to this possibility we also have
sizable beds of oil shale in the western part of the United
States which are a potential source of crude petroleum. We
could also further develop wells which have now been closed
down because of the uneconomic cost of securing the oil.
The industry believes that the change to other
sources of supply could be accomplished so gradually that it
would not disrupt our highly developed system of production
and refining of crude oil. However, the United States is not
the only country with underground deposits of oil and a
depletion of our stocks would mean that a greater attempt
would be made to develop foreign deposits. We would depend
upon imports for an added source of supply.
G. Petroleum Industry And Foreign Trade
1 • U. S, Trade Policy In Relation To Oi l
Although the future of foreign trade of petroleum
products may be based upon a public need which cannot be sup-
plied in the United States, the past activity of petroleum
products in the field of foreign trade has been on a commer-
cial basis. Our balance of trade figures indicate that we
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have favored the commercial rather than the conservation con-
cept, Prom the standpoint of our proven reserves it would he
better for us to forget about the exportation of petroleum
products and build up reserves to supply our future needs,
2, Dollar Value Of ISxports
In its foreign trade in oil, the United States has
long had a favorable balance of trade on a dollar basis. In
1929 the net exports (exports minus imports) amounted to
$390,300,000 and by 1938 to $321,900,000, By the end of 1939
this balance had further declined to $306,000,000, (1) Im-
ports are now confined virtually to crude oil and fuel oil,
while exports also include gasoline, kerosene, lubricating
oils, and other products,
3. Exports In Terms Of Barrels Of Petroleum
The exports of crude petroleum and petroleum prod-
ucts for the United States totaled approximately 180,000,000
barrels in 1938, the imports for the same year approximately
56,000,000 barrels. By the end of 1940 our exports of petro-
leum had declined to about 130,000,000 barrels and our imports
had increased to 82,800,000 barrels, indicating that our pol-
icy was beginning to change from a commercial aspect to an
aspect of conservation, (2) This change was of course brought
(1) U, S. Department Of Commerce, "Commodity Year Book",
1942, p 192
(2) Ibid, p 192
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about by the European war and the difficulty of moving prod-
ucts to foreign countries and our desire to build up stocks
for the impending war.
4. Imports Of Petroleum And Their Restrictions
The imports of crude oil and its products into the
United States was a very important factor in the early twen-
ties, but since 1932 have been restricted to a fairly steady
rate, proportional to domestic consumption. The means where-
by this restriction has been effectuated are two: the reve-
nue act of 1932, effective in June of that year, placing an
excise tax of 21 cents a barrel on crude and heavy products,
and 2.5 a gallon on gasoline, if imported for domestic con-
sumption: and a voluntary agreement between the Secretary
of the Interior and the principal importing companies to the
effect that imports shall be restricted to the average for
the last six months of 1932. fl)
5. Effects Of Import Restriction On Type And Volume Of Imports
These two means have caused interesting changes in
the composition of our foreign trade in petroleum. In the
first place, imports of crude oil have declined coincidentally
with the increase in exports of crude oil. *‘or example, in
1929 we imported 78,900,000 barrels of crude oil and exported
26,400,000 barrels: in 1938 the imports had dropped to
26,400,000 barrels and the exports had risen to 77,300,000. (2)
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Committee", 1942, p 224
(8) Pogue, James "Bconomios of Petroleum Industry", 1939
p 49, The Chase National Bank Of The City Of New York
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11118 change was caused by the 21 cents a barrel excise tax
on crude petroleum and voluntary restrictions on the volume
admitted, coupled with a rapid growth of foreign consumption.
By the end of 1940 this practice had changed some-what with
exports of 61,500,000 barrels of crude and imports of 43,800,000
barrels. (1) The entrance of the major nations of the world
into World War II was responsible for this change.
In the second place, our imports of gasoline have
declined from 8,800,000 barrels in 1929 to nothing in 1938,
under the imposition of a duty of two and one-half cents per
gallon, but exports of gasoline have also declined from 62,100,000
barrels in 1929 to 41,700,000 barrels in 1938 and further to
19,700,000 barrels in 1940. (2)
Therefore, from 1932 to 1938 the decline of imports
and increase in exports was the result of imposition of trade
barriers. The change from 1938 to 1940 which is characterized
by increasing imports and decreasing exports is the result of
the state of war in which the entire world was in, and since
the supplies of petroleum products have a very decided effect
upon the potential strength of the various warring nations,
the accumulation of supplies became their chief desire and
not the exportation of them. This point is discussed in greater
(1) American petroleum Institute, "Petroleum pacts and fig-
ures", 1941, p 148, 153
(2) Pogue, James £• "3oonomics of petroleum Industry'', 1939
p 49, The Chase National Bank Of The City Of New York
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detail in the next section, "Petroleum Industry Prom The
Standpoint Of A World At War". (1)
H. Transition Prom Peace To War-Time Activities
The transition from peace to war-time activities
has had a decided economic effect upon the petroleum industry,
especially in the refineries and in the transportation system.
The refineries are now being called upon to supply greater
and greater quantities of higher octane gasoline which is used
as aviation fuel. In addition, various other war-time demands
have been made upon the industry, which can be seen from the
following quotation of the Petroleum Division of the American
Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers.
"The Petroleum Industry has been called upon to produce a
great many products which are more or less of a secret nature
known broadly among the refiners but not generally written
up in publications. The principal one, of course, is toluol
from crude oil. Also, from certain refinery gases and gas
from high-pressure wells from Louisiana, amounium nitrate is
being made. This amounium nitrate is then used to nitrate
the toluol in order to produce T. N. T. in quantities never
dreamed of before." (2)
Prom the standpoint of transportation the industry
has felt the greatest economic effect. I't has been required
to utilize overland transportation system to a much greater
extent since the availability of tankers has become limited
and the submarine menace so great as to make it impracticable
to use them. The economic effects of this transition are
(1) See page 72
(2) Naramore, Chester, "personal Letter", American Institute
of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, December 28, 1942
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discussed to a greater extent in the section devoted to the
transportation system of the petroleum industry. (1)
The full importance of petroleum in World War II
is discussed in the next section, "Petroleum Industry Prom
Standpoint Of The World At War". We shall see that a large
part of the Axis military strategy is based upon their sup-
plies of oil, and how the American petroleum industry has
been affected by the war demands.
(1) See page 1£5
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III. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY PROM STANDPOINT OP WORLD AT WAR
A. Vital Factor In Cause And Strategy Of World War II
1. Introduction
Eighty years ago no one could have foretold that
in the greatest war in history both the most potent instru-
mentality and the gauge of military success would be the
mineral product that used to be set afire for gala purposes
as it floated on streams in northwestern Pennsylvania.
The importance of crude petroleum and its refined
products as an instrument of war was realized in World War
I. Its potentialities, other than as fuel for airplanes,
tanks, and submarines, were recognized when a fleet of taxi-
cabs was used to move troops to the front. Radical changes
in the tactics employed by the various branches of the armed
services were in sight and these possibilities have been
utilized to the fullest extent in the present war.
In this World War II every instrument of warfare,
except the blade. Is dependent upon petroleum for its lubri-.
cation and for its propelling power.
Airplanes, ships, tanks, trucks and service auto-
mobiles are all propelled by petroleum. Even the effective-
ness of our guns, no matter how large or how small, is de-
pendent upon oil for perfection in operation. Not a shell
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could be fired, not a soldier moved if it was not for this
vital mineral resource.
In the present world conflict, the military strategy
employed by the offensive nations has been governed largely
by their need for ample suppliesof petroleum. This need has
become of increasing importance as the prospect of a long war
seems inevitable. In the next few paragraphs we shall see
how the Axis powers endeavored to build up reserve stocks
of petroleum, planned for a quick victory, and when these
failed, tried a major conquest, all for oil supplies.
2. Pre-War Preparations
During the pre-war days the United States and Great
Britain, who had at their command large reserves of crude
petroleum, launched a conservation drive which aided them
in building up a reserve for the pending war.
Europe has never produced enough oil for her own
needs. In 1938, the last full year of peace, the total con-
sumption of what is now Hitler’s Europe amounted to between
200 and 210 million barrels. Total production from all
sources excluding Russia, was about 75 million barrels. This
left a deficiency of 125 million barrels which had to be
imported. (1)
In order to build up reserves sufficient to attain
at least partial self-sufficiency a four-point program of
starvation, storage, substitution and synthesis was adopted.
(1) Fortune, ’’Paradox of Oil and War”, September 1941, p 69
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Starvation was accomplished by the elimination of all non-
essential consumption of oil* Storage meant the accumulation
of immense reserves during the pre-war years by importing from
other nations* Substitution meant the mixing of alchol and
benzol with gasoline and the introduction of compressed gases
as motor fuel* Substitution was accomplished by using caster
oil, olive oil, and other vegetable products as lubricants
wherever possible.
The greatest development, and the most important
in relation to lack of natural supplies of crude oil, was the
development of a synthetic product. This principle of synthe-
sis was in operation long before Hitler took command of Ger-
many and was the result of discoveries by two German scien-
tists. Since petroleum is a hydrocarbon, it can be synthesized
in the laboratory from any source of carbon - including corn-
stalks - combined with hydrogen (which can be obtained from
water) in presence of a catalyst under proper conditions of
temperature and pressure. (1) But synthetic oil production
in volume depends upon coal and therefore is practical only
in Germany, Sngland, and a few other countries with large
coal reserves.
Hitler, realizing the importance of this synthetic
petroleum, took immediate steps to build plants which would
insure him of an adequate supply. By 1939 there were about
(1) Fortune, "Paradox of Oil and War", September 1941, p 72
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25 of these plants in operation and in 1958 they produced
ahout 10 million barrels of oil, or about one-fifth of Germany’s
consumption. (1) In 1941 the estimated production from their
synthetic plants was estimated at about 30 million barrels.
In addition to the development of synthetics. Hitler was also
purchasing Anglo-American oil, which was much cheaper than
his domestic product.
3 . Estimated War Needs of Petroleum Products
German generals made a very careful study of World
War I and found that Germany’s downfall was due to the fact
that she had to fight a prolonged war.
Hitler also knew that by the end of World War I
the allied land armies and air fleets alone were using about
1,350,000 barrels of oil per month. But this was nothing
compared to what experts thought would be needed in the war
of the future, fought with tens of thousands of planes and
huge mechanized forces. They estimated roughly that each
belligerent would require at least two or three times its
normal peace-time consumption.
For Germany to obtain reserves or supplies of oil
to carry on this type of war was simply impossible. The
war would have to be won quickly. Thus, oil was an impor-
tant factor in the planning of "blitzkrieg” operations, used
so effectively by the Germans in the early part of the war.
(1) Fortune, "Paradox of Oil and War", September 1941, p 72
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4 . Effect of the German 1 s European Campaign
According to German claims and British estimates
the German army used less than 12,000,000 barrels of gaso-
line, diesel oil, and lubricants in actual fighting from the
occupation of Poland to the conquest of Prance, Furthermore,
the stocks captured in Prance and the Low Countries amounted
to about 20 million barrels, so the Germans profited by this
conquest.
Hitler now possessed all the available oil in Europe.
By this control Germany was able to reduce consumption in the
unoccupied European countries by simply withholding supolies.
By doing this and reducing civilian consumption to an abso-
lute minimum Germany had reduced oil consumption in Europe to
the irreducible. Even then Hitler was faced with about a
15.000.
000 barrel shortage. Judged by the production possi-
bilities of the German Europe, only about 100,000,000 barrels
could be counted on, including the production of Rumania,
which in 1940 amounted to about 43,000,000 barrels. The
Germans thought they could raise production in these fields
and that was the reason for the bloodless invasion in 1940.
To make certain of routes for the oil from Rumania, Bulgaria,
Hungary and Yugoslavia were also forced into the Axis camp.
However, in 1941 the production in Rumania fell to about
38.000.
000 barrels annually and on top of the decline in pro-
duction, transportation difficulties kept a great part of the
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oil from arriving in Germany, Faced with these difficulties
there remained hut one thing to do, that is, build more syn-
thetic plants. It would take a considerable length of time
to get such plants into operation and also the synthetic pro-
duction was not capable of providing satisfactory lubricants
at an economic cost, A shortage in lubricants is as serious
as a shortage in gasoline or diesel fuel, since without it
machines will wear out in a very short time,
5, Hi tier 1 a March On Russia
Because of these two factors, and also his need
for food supplies, Hitler was faced with the need for captur-
ing adequate supplies of petroleum. Two possibilities were
open to the German army. They could either move toward the
great fields of Iran and Iraq and the Persian Gulf or else
toward the Soviet Baku and Grozny fields in Russia, Russia
was chosen, first
,
because its present yields of petroleum
are larger, even though the potentialities of the Persian
Gulf fields are larger, and secondly, if Hitler did move in-
to Iran and Iraq the British would probably destroy their oil
fields before they would allow them to fall into German hands,
and third, Germany would have to break Britain*s hold on the
Mediterranean in order to get the oil out. Therefore, Russia
was chosen as the immediate target.
Although, at the time of the invasion, a quick
victory by Germany was forecast by the experts, we have seen
what the outcome has been. Germany has thrown almost every-
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thing she has into the conflict and as yet has not succeeded.
Ironical as it may be, the reason Hitler has failed to suc-
ceed in his drive against Russia is that he lacks either high
grade lubricating oil or high octane gasoline. Neither of
these products can be secured from synthetic crude oil. Ger-
many evidently has plenty of diesel fuel for her submarines,
but a submarine will not crack Russia. It will take a great
air attack and according to Professor Mather of Harvard, an
expert on oil, the general inactivity of the German Luftwaffe
has been due to the lack of suitable fuel and lubricating
oils. (1)
If the Germans are successful in this campaign, and
are able to take the Russian fields intact (a small chance,
because of Stalin’s scorched earth policy) it would be a long
time before they could organize the 2500 mile supply line
from the Caspian Sea to Central Europe. If Hitler succeeds in
capturing Russia his next move probably will be to the south-
ward to capture the Suez, sieze Iran and Iraq, drive the Bri-
tish out of the Eastern Mediterranean and thereby open the sea
routes, the only convenient means of sending supplies from
Russia to Europe.
If Germany were able to accomplish this drive it
would mean that she would have the available crude oil sup-
plies to carry on a lengthy war and would probably be an
(1) Bartlett, K. S. "Why Hitler's Luftwaffe Has Had To Stay
On The Ground", Boston Sunday Globe, February 21, 1943
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important factor in determining the victor in the present
conflict.
6. Japan, Italy and Petroleum Supplies
The two other Axis powers are in the same predica-
ment as Germany, in that they do not have natural supolies
of crude oil large enough to be of any potential value in a
world conflict. Italy has very little oil and no coal re-
serves which make for synthetic production. As far as petro-
leum goes, she is a definite liability to Germany since she
must furnish the oil to keep the Italian army moving. Japan
is also very limited in natural resources of petroleum. How-
ever, she was wealthy enough and also far-sighted enough to
accumulate large quantities of petroleum before her break
with the United States. In addition to these reserves, she
quickly invaded the East Indies and Burma, the only important
oil producing areas in that part of the world. Even though
these fields were destroyed by the Dutch when they were
forced out, it is probable that the Japanese will have the
wells producing in another six months and if she is allowed
to remain in possession of these areas, will probably secure
enough oil to enable her to wage her war even after her
reserves have been exhausted.
Therefore, in this World War II, the military
strategy of the aggressor nations has been based upon the
need for petroleum. The job of the allied nations, who have
fought a defensive war, is to keep the Axis from gaining control
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of any more important sources of supply and also to solve
the problem of getting the oil they are capable of produc
ing to the combat zones.
B. Sources Of Supoly In Relation To Military Activity
As we have learned, the Axis supplies are very
limited, and even though they are able to conquer adequate
supplies, they will still have a problem of getting oil to
their fighting forces.
This problem of getting the supplies to the armed
forces is the same barrier confronting the Allied Nations.
1.
World Supplies
Prom the standpoint of world supply of oil, there
are three important production areas. These, in the order
of their importance, are:
1. Caribbean Basin - extending roughly from the northern
coast of South America to Central Plains of the United
States. Produces about 1,500,000 barrels annually.
2. Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Area, including Rumania,
the Caucusus, Iran and Iraq. Produces about 360,000,000
barrels annually.
3. Netherland East Indies. Produces about 56,000,000 barrels
annually. (1)
Out of these three main production areas all impor-
tant fields are controlled by the Allies except the fields
of Rumania and the Netherland East Indies. This latter source
was lost to the Japanese and the loss has had a very pronounced
(1) Fortune, "Socony’s World, The Struggle For Oil”,
February 1942, p 114
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effect upon the supplies of petroleum available to Great
Britain and the American forces in Australia. Supplies must
now come from the fields of Iran and Iraq or else from the
United States and South America. The allies have adequate
supplies in these areas since they are in possession of about
93 per cent of the total world production of crude petroleum
and 88 per cent of the refinery capacity of the world. (1)
2. Sources Of Supply Of The Allies
Of the sources of supply of the allied nations,
the United States ranks first in importance, having about
63 per cent of the total world supply of crude petroleum and
65 per cent of the total world refinery capacity. (2) The
next in importance are the South American countries of
Venezuela and Colombia. That is, they are the most important
in relation to supplies available for consumption by British
and American forces. Russia produces about ten per cent of
the crude of the world but it is all needed in her campaign
against Germany.
England produces only about five per cent of her
normal consumption which means she is almost entirely dependent
on imports from the fields of Iran and Iraq and the United
States
,
(1) Life, "World Oil, Its Geography Guides The War", May 18,
1942, p 57
(2) Ibid, p 57
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This means that the allies’ supply of oil is
dependent upon the efficiency of their transportation
facilities to move the oil to points of greatest need. The
only way of moving the oil is by tanker fleets and even
though the combined tanker fleets of the Allies would be
sufficient to accomplish this job, they are hampered by in-
creased distances due to the closing of certain lanes of
shipping by Nazi occupation, and secondly by the activity of
the German submarine fleet whose activities have been con-
centrated upon the tankers moving between allied sources
of supply and points of ultimate need.
C. Petroleum Production During Wan Time
1. Decline In Production
The effectiveness of the German submarine cam-
paign can be seen from the production figures for 1942 which
show that aporoximately 125 million barrels of crude were
not produced because of lack of transportation facilities.
The following table shows the production of the various
countries for 1942 in comparison to 1941 and the amount of
increase or decrease. Opposite the figures indicating a
decrease is given the reason for such a decrease in
production.
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Table 13
ESTIMATED WORLD PRODUCTION
Thousands of Barrels
Country 1942 1941 Change Cause
United States 1 ,385,500 1,404,182 18,682 D Transportation
U. S. S. R. 214,000 238 , 000 24,000 D Destruction
Venezuela 150,000 228,131 78,131 D Transportation
Iran 75,000 64,150 11,450 I
Rumania 37,800 38,450 650 D Transportation
Mexico 37,000 42,705 5,705 D Transportation
Trinidad 27,375 21,150 6,225 I
Argentina 23,275 21,765 1,510 I
Iraq 14,600 10,000 4,600 I
Peru 13,150 11,925 1,225 I
Colombia 10,600 24,639 14,039 D Transportation
Canada 10,450 10,123 327 I
Germany 10,000 9,450 250 I
Netherland East
Indies 9,000 61,000 52,000 D Destruction
Egypt 8,000 7,800 200 I
Bahrien Island 7,800 7,070 730 I
Saudi Arabia 6,000 5,750 250 I
Hungary 4,400 3,300 1,100 I
Japan 3,800 3,800
Burma 2,500 7,900 5,400 D Destruction
British India 2,500 2,245 255 D
Ecuador 1,800 1,560 240 I
Italy 1,350 1,250 100 I
Bolivia 300 275 25 I
Others 200 205 5 D
Total:
2 ,056,900 1,227,125 170,225 D
Source: Oil and Gas Journal, December 31, 1942
These figures show that the allied nations lost
about 75 million barrels as the result of destruction of
fields* The greatest loss by destruction was in the Nether-
land East Indies where control was lost to the Japanese,
Even though the production was lost to the Allied nations
by surrender, it was also lost to the captors because of the
efficient plan of destruction 'carried out by the evacuating
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Dutch. Destruction losses were also reported in the Maikop
fields of the Western Caucusus where fields were destroyed
as they fell into German hands.
The greatest loss has been due to the lack of
transportation facilities. Production in Colombia has vir-
tually stopped because of transportation difficulties, and
drastic cuts in Venezuelian and American production have
also occurred for the same reason.
2. Decline In Drilling Activity
Production may have declined during 1942 but this
does not mean that the recoverable reserves will be increased
for future generations. In conjunction with this decline in
production there has been a corresponding decrease in drill-
ing activity or exploration. During 1942 drilling declined
roughly 40 per cent from operation in 1941. (1) The main
reasons for this decline were the unsatisfactory price
structure, shortages of labor and equipment, and increase in
the price of available lapd; also the ruling which requires
a 40 acre well spacing. As a result of these factors, drill-
ing was curtailed and new discoveries were reported at 322.8
million barrels or about 23.3 per cent of production for the
year. (2) In addition to new wells drilled, the extensions
made in previously drilled wells were estimated at 518.5 million
(1) Howard, W. V., "War Time Regulations Sharply Reduce
Drilling Operations During 1942", Oil and Gas Journal
January 28, 1943, p 72
(2) Ibid, p 72
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barrels or 57.5 per cent of production. The new fields
along with the extensions amounted to 543.1 million barrels,
39.2 per cent less than output. (1) Reserves were not
estimated upwards this time. We are producing our oil faster
than we are discovering new oil. This condition has really
been in existence for the past several years but war demands
are aggravating the situation.
3 . Cost of Petroleum Production During War Time
The cost of producing petroleum is subject to wide
variations depending upon production. During peace times,
when proration was working effectively, the cost of produc-
tion was kept fairly constant. However, when it becomes
necessary to produce as rapidly as possible without regard
for future supplies, the cost of production usually declines.
The petroleum industry is experiencing the same problems as
all other industries, in the shortage of materials and labor,
and the increased wage demands. However, according to statis-
tics reported by the industry for 1941, the production costs
per barrel have been declining since 1939. (2) This decline
in production costs at present will be offset by increased
costs of production when it becomes necessary to produce
(1) Howard, W. V., "War Time Regulations Sharply Reduce
Drilling Operations During 1942", Oil and Gas Journal,
January 28, 1943, p 72
(2) Ralph, Henry D.
,
"Report On Production Costs Show Wide
Disparity Among Fields", Gas and Oil Journal,
January 28, 1943
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the stripper wells after flush production periods have
passed.
D. War Time Consumotion
1. Comparison To Peace Time
In 1940, the last full year of peace, the United
States’ consumption of petroleum products amounted to 1.4
billion barrels. Since that time consumption has increased
to about 1.6 billion barrels in 1941 and estimated consump-
tion for 1942 is 1.5 billion barrels. These figures show
that there have been gains in consumption of petroleum
products in spite of civilian rationing. These increasing
gains are accounted for by the steadily expanding needs of
our country’s military machine, both within and outside its
boundaries.
Accurate statistics are not available as to just
how much our armed forces are consuming since these figures
are considered a military secret. Some estimates have been
made on the basis of a total war, assuming that we had a
force of 125,000 planes, 75,000 tanks, and 10,000,000 tons
of shipping. This is our goal for 1943 and to operate this
war machine it would take approximately 250,000,000 barrels
of petroleum products or about one- seventh of our total
annual consumption. (1)
(1) Standard And Poors, "Industrial Surveys, Oil", March
11, 1942
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2. Anticipated Future Demands
The Petroleum Industry War Council has predicted
that by the last quarter of 1943 demands for petroleum
products will have risen to about 4.6 million barrels daily,
which is an increase of 400,000 barrels daily over 1942; an
increase of about nine per cent over the last quarter of
1942. (1)
3 . Effect of North African Campaign
The Council also predicts that the 1943 demands
will be affected by the campaign in North Africa. If this
campaign is successful, it will enable the Allies to gain
control of the Mediterranean which would allow a freer use
of allied oil supplies in the Persian Gulf and also lift
the severe restrictions on the movement of oil from the
northern tier of South American countries and Dutch West
Indies. This would permit the refineries of the United States
to concentrate their activities upon the production of high
octane fuel. The American refineries are more capable of
producing this high octane fuel than any other allied refiner-
ies. Great Britain does very little, if any, refining now,
importing her supplies in the refined stage. All the British
refineries were located on the channel and were subjected
to heavy bombing attacks which have rendered them practically
worthless.
(1) Willson, C. 0., ’’Oil Demand At A New Peak”, Oil and
Gas Journal, January 28, 1943
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4. Effect of Consumer Rationing
Consumer rationing was intended to reduce civilian
consumption by about forty per cent, but increased consump-
tion of trucks and busses, plus increased military require-
ments within this country, have reduced the total expected
decrease to about 20 to 25 per cent. This decrease is re-
flected in the decline in consumption for 1942, The consump-
tion figures for 1941 were placed at 1,580 million barrels.
In 1942 these consumption figures had decreased 30 million
barrels, which was the result of consumer rationing because
we had seen that military demands were in a continual state
of increase.
5. Analysis Of Year-End Inventory Of Stocks
These demands exceeded production as we have men-
tioned previously. The most accurate way of measuring the
decrease is to compare the decrease in reserve stocks for
the years in question.
The December 1942 stocks were the lowest year- end
inventory since 1924 when stocks of all oil on December 31
aggregated 492 million barrels. Measured in days' supply in
relation to demand that materialized in 1925, the 1924 stocks
represented 211 days' requirements. In comparison the inven-
tories at the close of 1942 in relation to minimum anticipated
demand for 1943 were approximately 110 days' supply. (1)
(1) Willson, C. 0., ’’Oil Demand At New Peak”, Oil and Gas
Journal, January 28, 1943, p 239
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On December 31, 1941 we had stocks of refined products
anountlrgto approximately 263 million barrels. By December
31, 1942 this stock had decreased 41 million barrels to 222
million barrels, (1)
The large reduction in gasoline stocks of about
12 million barrels, according to the American petroleum In-
dustry reports, came as a surprise to those who anticipated
that voluntary and enforced rationing would see the tanks
of refiners over-flowing with excess gasoline. From Septem-
ber 1941 to September 1942 the civilian consumption of gas-
oline did decline by about 14.5 per cent but this decline
was evidently absorbed by an increase in military demands
and the increased demands by public carriers. (2)
The production of between 325,000 and 345,000 bar-
rels daily of 100 octane airplane gas is estimated to off-
set about 30 to 45 per cent of the curtailment in motor fuel
consumption. (3) This is only one war demand. Increased
demands for lower grade gasolines, fuel oils and lubricants
of all types will probably increase petroleum consumption
for 1943 well above 1942 uses aud even 1941 figures, even
though civilian rationing is operated effectively.
(1) Oil and Gas Journal, "Production Stocks Of Principal
petroleum products", December 30, 1942
(2) American Petroleum Institute, "Statistical Bulletin",
Vol. AXIII, No* 52, December 2, 1942, p 5
(3) Norman, Stanley H. "War Demands Assure Steady Refinery
Operations", Oil and Gas Journal, January 28, 1943
p 79
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E. Foreign Trade Of A Vital War Product
When nations become involved in a war almost
every other activity becomes secondary to the military
campaign. Foreign trade seems to fall into this secondary
group. Our main interests are no longer financial, but are
in securing the necessary supplies to wage a successful war
and ultimately become the victor.
No accurate statistics are available as to the
place of petroleum products in our war-time foreign trade.
Those figures would be of particular interest to the enemy
powers and, therefore, are withheld from the public.
We do know that the foreign trade of petroleum
products has changed with the war. In the pre-war years the
United States imported very little petroleum since her sup-
plies were adequate for her domestic consumption. We did
import some in order to acquire trade balances in various
foreign countries. During war time we have been importing
as much crude petroleum as possible. Trade barriers have
been lifted and new agreements made with Mexico and South
American countries. Our exports are chiefly of refined
products and those that are not moving to our own military
forces are moving to our Allies under the Lend-Lease Act.
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P. Conclusion
Prom the standpoint of a nation at war, the petro-
leum industry is of prime importance. It is second only to
the steel industry and some people put it on a par with the
steel industry in carrying on the war, because all transpor-
tation problems, on the water, underneath the water, on
land, and in the air depend on petroleum products, and it is
hoped that by a lack of these we can eventually stop Hitler.
The war has caused our production and consumption
figures of petroleum products to increase, and as a result
is hastening the depletion of our nation *s ultimate supply.
The war has also had some beneficial effects upon
the industry. Technological developments have been made in
refining of petroleum in the last two years that under peace-
time conditions might well have taken ten or more years to
accomplish.
The most serious problem that has confronted the
petroleum industry by the war is the problem of transportation
of its products. As we have noted, this has been the main
reason why production figures of the allied nations have
declined.
The seriousness of the problem has been recognized
by the government and the public, as well as the petroleum
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industry, which has resulted in new and more efficient means
of transporting oil.
Here again, the war has speeded a development that
would have taken years to accomplish. The cost of pipe lines
practically prohibited the industry from building a trans-
continental line. With government aid this project has been
started and is now nearly completed.
The next section, "Transportation and the Petroleum
Industry", gives a more complete analysis of the growth of
the petroleum industries’ transportation system and what ef-
fects the projects initiated by the war demands will have
upon the post-war industry.
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IV. TRANSPORTATION AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
1. Importance Of Transportation System
The transportation facilities of the industry are
as much a part of the plant as is the smokestack of a great
factory. They bring supplies of raw material; insure pro-
ducers of oil a constant market; afford prompt and cheap dis-
tribution of products; and encourage independent producers
and wild catters to develop new sources of supply.
An efficient and economical transportation system
is not built in a few days. It must necessarily develop
through experience and changing demands. This has been the
trend of development of the transportation system of the
petroleum industry.
Prom the standpoint of transportation the petroleum
industry is unique, in that it has aided in the development
and has utilized all the facilities of transportation; namely,
railroads, ships, pipe lines, and trucks. Another unique
characteristic is that the bulk of these facilities are owned
and operated by the industry. Of course, it does not own the
railroads but it does own the majority of oil cars that are
hauled by the railroads. The only means of transportation in
which private investment exceeds industry investment is in
trucks. Trucks, as volume carriers, are not very important
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today. The importance is derived from their flexibility
and economic savings in the presence of short hauls,
2, Investment Of Industry In Transportation System
By the end of 1937 the industry had a total invest-
ment in transportation facilities of about $818 ,000,000 which
does not include the investment in motor trucks. (1) Al-
Ihougi this investment is large
,
the economic dividends h«v*
undoubtedly justified the expenditure. The owning and operat-
ing of your own facilities allows for a greater degree of
flexibility and a greater willingness to improve facilities
to keep up with the trends of the time* The effectiveness of
the system today is due primarily to the efforts of the entire
industry to increase the efficiency of the system and at the
same time reduce the cost of transportation, which naturally
reduces the cost of refined products to the ultimate consumer.
In order to establish a background for the develop-
ment of the transportation system, it is necessary to present
a brief historical review.
B. Historical Growth Of Transportation System
1. First Methods - Wagons And Oil Barges
When the pioneer oil well was drilled by Colonel
Brake in 1857, the nation had seen three decades of rail build-
ing and railroad development, but these roads had not reached
(1) American .Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts And Pig-
ures", Seventh Bdition, 1941, p 178
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Titusville, Pennsylvania. The nearest railroad was still
25 miles away.
Thus the problem of transportation began with the
birth of the industry. As was noted in the account of Drake's
discovery, the first containers were barrels of every size,
type and description. There were two ways of getting these
barrels to market. One was to float boats down Oil Creek to
the Alleghany &iver at Oil uity and the other was to have the
barrels hauled by team and wagon.
Prior to 1862 about 6000 teams were regularly used
in hauling oil from Oil Creek to the railroads. It was not
an uncommon sight to see a solid line of teams a mile or so
long on the roads heading into the railroad shipping stations.
Naturally the price for hauling by this system was
high. The charges varied from $1.00 to #5.00 per barrel de-
pending upon the supply of drivers and the speed of produc-
tion. The producers suffered because of these difficulties
since flowing wells brought the price of crude lower and the
cost of transportation higher. It actually cost more to trans-
port a barrel of oil from Oil Creek, Pennsylvania, to Union
Mills, Pennsylvania, a distance of about 25 miles, than it
did to move the oil from Union Mills to New York City. The
freight cost per barrel to New York in January of 1862 was
#2.40. (1)
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 310
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2, Tank Vessels
Some relief was secured by using oil barges which
were floated down Oil Creek. These boats ordinarily held
from 700 to 800 gallons and carried the oil either in bulk or
in barrels. These tank barges were wooden scows about eight
feet deep and 100 feet long and carried the crude oil in the
hull. The danger of fire and the loss of crude made it neces-
sary to change to better methods. The next improvement was
the installation of an iron tank inside the wooden hulls.
But not until 1888 was the first American tanker built, having
a capacity of about 300,000 gallons. (1) This development
soon became a part of the oil transportation system, owned
and operated by the oil companies and recognized because of
economical costs of transportation.
3. Pipe Lines
The pipe line was first recognized as a means of
transportation in the early 1860’s. In 1862 the Pennsylvania
State Legislature passed an act which incorporated a company
to carry oil from any point on Oil Creek to the mouth of the
creek or any point on the Philadelphia and Erie Railroad. The
purpose of this act was to prevent any further acts of vio-
lence similar to the one that occurred when a group of team-
sters destroyed an oil line four miles long, which had a
capacity of 60 barrels a day. This incident occurred prior to
1862. With the protection of this act a line was completed on
(1) American Petroleum Institute, ’’Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 312
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February 19, 1863. The line was two and one-half miles long
and was simply a two-inch iron pipe. (1)
The railroads offered no opposition as long as the
pipe lines were used to carry crude oil from point of pro-
duction to the rail facilities. However, when pipe lines were
used to carry the crude directly to the refinery the railroads
began to complain. The first real resistance came when a three
inch line capable of moving 3500 barrels of oil per day was
laid from Millerstown, .Pennsylvania to Clairview, .Pennsylvania,
near Pittsburgh. This line crossed railroad rights and because
of this were torn up by the roads. The pipe line company
managed to overcome this barrier by building storage tanks on
each side of the property and then transporting the oil across
the rights by other means.
Thus the development of pipe lines met opposition
mainly, because it was something new and was proving to be a
more economical means of transportation and evidently destined
for tremendous growth. The fears of this opposition were not
groundless as we shall see in a more detailed discussion of
pipe lines. (2)
Even though railroads were in existence prior to
the first pipe lines they had done very little about improv-
ing the methods of transportation. The industry needed the
roads very much though, especially for the moving of refined
(1) American .petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee”,
1942, p 311
( 2 ) See page 100
'...
,
.
• >: - .
.
.
•«
*
.
•
.
*
•
"
• ~
- • -
-
'
t
• • •
.
.
- .
•
.
,
.
: -
«
98
products, so it became the responsibility of the oil companies
to devise and design new and more efficient equipment for trans-
portation by the railroads.
4. railroads
As we have noted, the first containers moved by rail-
roads were barrels stacked on flat cars or stood inside the
box cars. l*he oil companies were not satisfied with the bar-
rels because of the expense, not only of securing, but also of
loading and unloading, so they began to seek a new method. In
1865 an oil buyer conceived the ides of mounting wooden tanks
on flat cars; each tank having a capacity of about 45 gallons.
/
The experiment was successful and from this beginning our
modern steel tank oar has developed. The roads recognized the
benefits of the tank oars but refused to supply them to the
oil companies because of their special design. This led to the
controversy which the courts finally decided in favor of the
railroads, and the petroleum industry now has about ^200,000,000
invested in tank cars. (1)
The foregoing discussion has been primarily to estab-
lish the historical background of each type of transportation.
However, a more complete discussion of these four main types
is necessary to bring them up to date and to determine the
importance of each means to the petroleum industry and the
consuming public.
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 312
.. 0 .’•'V ..
.
.• oo ' : • • :
v ' ^ ' ‘ lil'-
' '
•id .cjo-jX
s
.
-li- • " S - • - '
'
i '-*3 <-
,
J
; : C ' * ' i;
t <
,
r. .
'
• *v •.
•
v 5 ?i ,f: lOtB. 1 H? 0^^ -I
"
.
•
'•
.
99
C. Analysis Of Important Facilities For Transporting Oil
1. Railway Tank Cars
Tank oars convey the petroleum by rail. As we not-
ed in the historical development these cars, although hauled
by the railroads, are largely owned by the oil companies. The
modern tank car has a capacity of about 8,000 gallons which
means a carload weight varying from 52,800 pounds to 59,200,
depending upon the type of product hauled. (1) These figures
take on a definite meaning when compared to the fact that a
box car loaded with barrels of oil can only carry about 28,000
pounds. The carrying capacity of the railroads is more than
doubled by the use of the specially designed oars.
By the end of 1940 the various oil companies had a
total of 135,854 tank cars in operation as compared to about
12,000 owned by the railroads. (2) The cars owned by the
railroads are supplied to the industry on a rental basis in
addition to the regular charge for hauling the oil.
Tank cars are used primarily for the transportation
of the refined product to inland areas not serviced by pipe
lines or water-ways. Very small amounts of crude are trans-
ported by the railroads. In the first nine months of 1940 of
all the petroleum products moved by the railroads crude petro-
leum totaled about 8$, which means that 92$ of the petroleum
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Tempory National Economic Committee",
1942, p 313
(2) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures", Seventh Edition, p 141
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products hauled by the railroads, are refined, (1)
The railroads reimburse the oil companies to some
extent for the supplying of their own tank cars. This reim-
bursement comes in the form of rebate and is at a fixed rate
of one and-half cents per mile loaded and empty. The rebate
is paid to the oil companies, because in supplying their own
ears they are preforming a part of the transportation service
which would ordinarily be supplied by the railways. This al-
lowance does not fully cover the costs of tank car ownership
and maintenance. A study was made of this subject by the pe-
troleum industry for a three year period covering 74,447 cars
and it showed that to fully cover repairs and operating costs
directly relating to tank car ownership, depreciation, taxes,
and six per cent on the depreciated investment, would require
a mileage allowance in excess of two and one-half cents per
mile loaded and empty. (8)
The failure on the part of the railroads to cooper-
ate as fully as possible in the construction and maintenance
of tank oars has resulted in the continual decline of petro-
leum products handled by the railroads and has prompted the
industry to seek more economical methods of transportation.
2. Pipe Lines
The use of pipe lines in the transportation of pe-
troleum, is more peculiar to the industry than any of the other
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Faots and Figures",
Seventh Edition, pages 119 and 141
(2) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hearings
before Temporary National Economic Committee", 1942,
p 313
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facilities, uailroads, ships, and trucks, although used for
the transporting of petroleum, are also used in the transporta-
tion of other products as much or more than they are in the
moving of oil* However, the sole purpose of the pipe line is
to carry oil*
Because of its peculiarity to the petroleum industry
and the fact it is not as well known publcally as the other
means, a brief account of its operation as well as its growth
and economic importance will be given.
As the term is used in the oil business a pipe line
is not merely a long string of pipe, but consists of all the
facilities including working tanks, power plants, pumping sta-
tions, systems of communication along the line, and all other
equipment required to move the oil* It is one of the most
highly technical branches of the oil industry, requiring an
understanding of hydraulics, the design and spacing of pump
stations, and the design or selection of station equipment in-
cluding telephone and telegraph systems* Pipe lines are di-
vided into two general classes, the gathering system, which
/
brings the oil from the wells to central points of delivery,
and the trunk lines, which are the main arteries moving the
oil to its ultimate destination* Pipe sizes vary from two to
twelve inches in diameter but the common sizes are six or eight
inches* The trunk lines are laid below the surface but the
smaller gathering lines, because of their temporary character,
are usually strung along the surface*
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Research in recent years has been responsible for
notable changes in methods and practices of pipe line opera-
tion and construction. Within a very few years came the use
of seamless pipe with higher tensile strength and thinner
walls and lengths of thirty or forty feet instead of the pre-
vious twenty foot lengths, This new pipe has plain ends for
welding together instead of a screw end coupling, as was for-
merly used*
The longer lengths of pipe made the use of tractors
and other machinery necessary in construction and hand tools
were abandoned* This tended to speed up building. Sleotrie
motors were also installed as a permanent device.
In level country pumping stations are about forty
miles distant; in rough country closer. The stations usually
have storage capacities varying from 10,000 to 55,000 barrels.
The speed at which oil moves through pipe lines
varies with the size of the line, the capacity of the pumping
facilities, and the topography of the district in which the
oil is moved* The speed varies from one to five miles per
hour depending upon these conditions. A four inch line, under
a pressure of 800 pounds per square inch, will deliver about
3800 barrels of crude in 24 hours; a six inch line, 10,000
barrels, and an eight inch line, 21,000 barrels. (1)
The growth of the use of pipe lines as a means of
(1) National jcetroleum News, "ISducat ional Issue”, February
5, 1936, p 390
v «£<fi eu©q©?n fl©©' " : i ai do*xa©»r©fl
. ^ify? fcfcil «qly 1© eeoi* o# 4 ?.- baa sbodSeis ai &o$aadO aldaroa
**r en? 9:^J5 ’*©! ^*©t « aldtlti .aolfosnJ boo© bna cc£r
baa 4tf$s©s$© ©Ii*a©d lexigld da iw eqiq ©e©Irca©@ lo
-e*i edit to bae-sai ; set *10 ±o ed3$a©X baa aXiaw
•?
. t t iae .leXii earf »qxq weo aid'i ,ed4sa©X ioct i?a©«tf si/oiv
-
. oi aaw aa ^flilqsao £«ts «&%*© a io ba©3eai i<*d*v%o$ &aibX©«r
o
•
3 *co; bj‘»rf ;?-• aei .05 ai £ia«tr#o©-: x •v-ainuaia n&jiro boa
•$<ti Miatf qa fca©qe c a - .beaofooada ©a©w
*eoiv©i jaeaaareoq a aa beXIatfsai osXa a*i©*« osa
•fiX . • c; . * 00 i ia; .. ^ax . \ ;iir r;soo r«vel a.'
qXCatif.u aaoitfeta ©dt ,*i©8cj aa d^Sft% at ; 2 £iai©M Selim
.
:..0-
,
• 0 ,C : : . :•* 1 ga •irzav £ : Sisaqi.., • •"• '.q>s ©tfarf
a r:ai± eqiq ii$xf©*d;f sevoai lie doirfv Ja b©eqs? ©rf?
axU to '{ffloaqa© ed3 ,&al£ eri? to ©si? ©d*’ bJiw s©>%av
©rit doirfw ai fral^aib ©d? to qdqaT$cqc > ed* baa ,a©i3 ill oat
tax av.it «ao a$%l seina* intcqs ©dv *b©voja ei Xio
. .i:ixi
,
o; i . dorti *xj t $ »3aoi?ibaoo searfc aoqa gcibaeqefc 'ixjo ri
: 00 a lev.Xeb Hive ,rfooi esaape leu soa^o q 006 io auras©?q
000,OX t ©aiX doai xl* a jeurorf *S ai ©ban© 1c nltiuid 0085
. :
)o 3n*©« a sa «aail eqiq to ©bjj ©bJ tc dtfw©** ©df
>:; i:X
,
•;</«'- /* .nr:. t.'yj.ffrT"
,
*
*
'ill ^ii©l© <l‘J©'i XaaoiaeK f I )
C0£
. t
d£ i
f
d
103
transportation of petroleum products can be seen from the
following table which shows the increase in the number of
miles of operating line from 1879 to 1940.
Table 14
U. S. Petroleum Pipe-Line Mileage By Years
1940. . • • #
ICC
Lines
Unavailable
1939. . • • • . 98,681
1938. . • • • . 95,938
1937. . • • . 96,612
1936. . • • • . 93,926
1935. . • • • . 92,037
1932. . • • • . 92,782
1929. . • • • . 85,796
1925. . • • • . 70,009
1920. . • • . 52,993
1900. . • • • . 17,973
1879. . • • • . 694
Source
:
ire troleum Pacts And Pi
p 124
Total
Petroleum
Pine Lines
All
Lines
126,400
122,500
119,050
119.150
115,980
113,800
115.150
106,650
85,900
s, Seventh Edition, 1941
This table shows that by the end of 1940 we had in
existence about 122,500 miles of pipe line. 13nough line, if
laid end to end, to encircle the world five times. By sub-
tracting the total mileage listed under the heading Interstate
Commerce Commission lines from the total of other lines, we
are able to secure the number of lines in operation which are
intrastate. This shows that in 1939 we had 23,319 miles of
intrastate lines, which we have described before as being more
temporary in structure and are used mainly as gathering lines.
The number of miles of line in operation at the end
of 1939 was equal to about one-half the total number of miles
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of railroad in existence. The railroads had about 240,000
miles of usable roadbed. (1)
However, the pipe line business contrasts sharply
with the railroad business in a number of respects. Railroads
carry a large variety of goods. Pipelines are equipped to
handle one type of commodity only. Railroads may count upon
a volume of business for an indefinite period. Pipe lines
face a variable and uncertain traffic, the only assurance
being that of a decline rather than a possible expansion in
the volume of business. Unlike the railroad, which serves a
multitude of patrons, the pipe line serves the refineries,
whose wants not only fluctuate with the state of general
business, but also vary according to the shifting conditions
of the oil industry.
It is for these reasons that pipe lines are asso-
ciated with refineries and refining interests have supplied
the initiative and the caoital for their construction. A
refinery must run every hour of every day of every year. The
flow of crude must not stop if the cost is to be kept down.
There has been some agitation in the past for con-
gressional legislation which would divorce the pipe lines
from ownership by refiners or by producers of crude oil and
have them operate solely as common carriers. In reality, pipe
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 314
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lines are common carriers. Their interstate rates are fixed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, their intrastate rates
by state commissions. Because of the fluctuations in tonnage
the fixing of reasonable rates involves difficulties. In
periods of flush production, low rates would be adequate, but
they would mean a loss later as production declined. If the
pipe line 3 were independent there would be agitation for a
low rate during flush periods and an insistence that rates
must not be raised as depletion sets in. The raising of
transportation costs would so increase the price of oil that
buyers would be unable to pay this increased cost. Such prac-
tices would mean the abandonment of stripper wells and a sub-
stantial loss of available crude. A new field would not at-
tract pipe lines until it had proved worth while. Only a
refiner, who is seeking new supplies and has adequate capital,
can take the risks of building lines to new fields.
The cost of laying pipe lines necessarily varies
with the size of the pine laid, the cost of the materials
that go into the line, and the scale of wages that must be
paid. The big 24 inch line that is under construction now is
costing approximately $67,000 per mile. (1) Of course, if
this line were built under peace-time conditions, the cost
would be considerably less.
By the end of 1939 the lines which were under the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission represented
a total Investment of $829,600,000. This figure divided
(1) Business Weem, "The Big Inch Grows", November 7, 1942,
p 19
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by the total number of miles of line in operation in 1939 of
98,681, gives an average cost per mile of $8, 205,00. (1)
This of course is a composite figure of all sizes
of pipe and of all economic conditions of construction. Never-
theless it serves to show us that a pipe line construction is
costly and necessarily must be handled by someone, such as
the refiner, who has a definite need for the product it sup-
plies, in order to take the risk of building.
The capacities of the pipe lines in the United States
can be seen by studying the statistics of the total amounts
of oil transported by pipe lines in 1940. According to sta-
tistics supplied by the Bureau of Mines there were 939,700,000
barrels of crude oil delivered to refineries by pipe lines
and 97,000,000 barrels of refined produots delivered to the
pipe lines by refiners. (2) This is about three and one-
half times as much crude as was transported by tank vessels
which rank second in importance.
The pipe lines are definetely an efficient means of
conveyance, in that they serve to supply the refineries with
ample crude at a minimum of cost which results in a lower re-
tail price of refined products to the consumer. i.’he pipe
lines are more economical to build than railroads and serve
the industry more adequately because- of their flexibility.
For overland transportation of petroleum products, they will
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Facts and Fig-
ures”, pages 124 and 127
(2) Ibid, p 120
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be the important facility in oar post-war world* The coat
of transporting by pipe line in comparison to railway costs
already insures them the overland business* (1) But they
still are unable to compete with the tankers in respect to
cost of transportation and it seems evident that tank vessels
will continue to operate economically in the years to come*
3* Tank Vessels
The total number, tonnage, and capacity of the
United States tankers can be seen from the following table:
(1) See page 114
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Table 15
Number, Tonnage, And Capacity Of U. S* Tank
Vessels
(As of January 1, 1941)
Type Of Vessel
Number
of
Vessels
Gross
Tonnage
Cargo
Capacity
(Barrels
)
Steam tankships:
500 gross tons and over
Under 500 gross tons
350
5
2,498,325
1.656
28,796,128
9.375
Total steam ships 355 2,499,981 28,805,503
Motor tankships:
500 gross tons and over
Under 500 gross tons
117
192
449,939
22.594
5,547,980
240.380
Total motor ships 309 472,533 5,788,360
Total tankships:
500 gross tons and over
Under 500 gross tons
467
197
2,948,264
24.250
34,344,108
249.755
Total tankships 664 2,972,514 34,593,863
Ooean, coastwise, Great
Lake 8 tank barges
Inland tank barges
108
1.292
110,201
490.549
1,584,404
6.288.926
Total barges 1.400 600.750 7.873.330
Grand total 2,064 3,573,264 42,467,193
Source: American Petroleum
Figures", 1941, j
Institute
p 129
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This shows that as of January 1, 1941 we had some 664 tank
vessels with gross tonnage of 2,972,514 tons and a cargo
capacity of 54,593,865 barrels. In addition to these tank
vessels there are some 1400 non-oropelled barges of various
capacities having a gross tonnage of 600,750 tons and a
cargo capacity of 7,873,330 barrels. In total then, our
tanker fleet has a cargo capacity of about 42,500,000 barrels.
The size and relative importance of the American
tanker fleet may be more graphically indicated in another way.
Placing bulk petroleum in one group and all the other com-
modities carried by American ships in another, if passenger
ships are excluded and freight-carrying ships of over 2000
gross tons or more considered, the ships in the American tanker
fleet carrying petroleum have a gross tonnage equal to more
than 50$ of the freighters which carry all other commodities. (1)
The fact that as of June 30, 1939, about 25$ of the
tanker tonnage of the world was under the American flag, fur-
ther indicates the importance of the tanker fleet. (2)
The industry realized, however, that in case of war
the tanker fleet wou}.d be one of the first called into the
service and therefore some of the tankers built prior to 1940
were made in conformance to government specifications. We
can now see that this was a brilliant move because every year
(1) American Petroleum Institute, ‘'Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 315
(2) Ibid, p 315
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since the outbreak of the war increasing numbers of tankers
have been converted from peace-time to war service.
This great fleet has been largely built for and
is in the main owned and operated by the petroleum industry.
More than 80 per cent of the larger petroleum carrying ships
are owned by oil companies. The relatively small number not
so owned are chartered to oil companies or others as they
may be required.
Tank vessels never operate as common carriers.
They operate exclusively as proprietary carriers. There has
been agitation for a legislative act which would make them
common carriers, giving the Interstate Commerce Commission
control over them. It is doubtful whether such control would
be economical or not. It would result in unnecessary delays
in shipping since permission would have to be granted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission before any contracts could be
let. Another characteristic of the tankers which makes it
seem illogical for Interstate Commerce Commission control is
the fact that they are designed to carry only one product and
are utilized by only one industry, thus they can hardly be
classed as common carriers.
One point in favor of such control is that it would
act as a check upon the movement of ’’hot oil”. (1) If all
shipments were checked before they were allowed to move, it
would be a comparatively easy task to make sure that all
taxes had been paid.
(1) Oil upon which the fair share of taxes has not been paid
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4. Tank Trucks
The newest development in the conveyance of
petroleum products has been the increasing use of tank
trucks. This type of transportation has restored two of
transportation’s earliest characteristics which were obscured
in the predominately railroad area. These characteristics
are (1) that it is extensively private, and (2) that the
owner-operator of the vehicle is not the owner of the roadbed.
Transportation has come back to the public highway and with
it a steadily increasing volume of freight, privately trans-
ported. A comoarison of mileages suggests the possibilities
of this trend. Contrasted with 238,000 miles of railway,
122.000 of pipe lines, 27,000 of inland water ways, there
are over 3,000,000 miles of public roads in steady process
of improvement. Over these roads the motor truck is capable
of carrying property to almost every home and to every place
of business.
The statistical reports as to the number of trucks
in operation carrying petroleum are not very complete. About
the only information available is that during 1941 there were
4.876.000 trucks registered in the United States. Of this
number 1,234,000 were listed as motor trucks and 32,600 as
tractor trucks and the remaining were not segregated. (1)
Of these trucks, 40,000 are actually owned and operated by
(1) American Petroleum Industries Committee, ’’Tax Economic
Bulletin”, Vol. VII, Number 6, September 1942
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the oil companies. (1) As to the privately owned tracks
used for the transportation of petroleum, there are no accu-
rate available statistics.
The transportation by truck has several advantages
which seem to indicate that it will become of increasing im-
portance in the future. The greatest advantage, of course, is
its importance in the field of short hauls. Its cost of
transporting over short distances is much less than the other
facilities and requires less time. The fact that motor trucks
are used almost entirely for short hauls is made clearer by
a study made by the American Petroleum Industries Committee
in 36 states. This study showed that only 14 per cent of all
the trucks registered in these states actually traveled out-
side the state during the year 1941. (2)
The other advantages are that it involves compar-
atively low original investment and permits a flexibility
which is not attainable by railroads, pipe lines or ships.
Of course, its activities are limited to refined products since
its cost would be prohibitive in the carrying of crude oil.
With the entrance of tank trucks into the petroleum industry
it is possible for refined products to be delivered directly
to the consumer's door and in this way adds another consumer
service which is preformed by the industry.
(1) Standard and Poor's, "Industry Surveys of Oil", March
11, 1942
(2) American Petroleum Industries Committee, "Tax Economics
Bulletin", Vol. VII, Number 1, April 1942
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D. Comparison Of Costs Of Important Methods Of Transportation
In the petroleum industry transportation system
cost figures assume more importance than an indication of
most economical means of transportation. In the industry
every new method was developed mainly for one reason. Its
cost variations have speeded the development of the efficient
system now in operation.
Just how much cheaper each means has been is a
question that cannot be answered with any high degree of ac-
curacy. Statistical reports have been incomplete and even
if they were complete they would soon be out-dated because
of rapidly changing conditions.
Approximate comparative costs were cited by James
E. Pogue in his publication, "Economics of the Petroleum
j
Industry", published in 1939* In this publication Mr. Pogue
states, quote, "Comparative costs per ton-mile are approx-
imately 6.3 mills by rail, 3.2 mills by pipe line, and 1.25
mills by tank vessel". (1)
Mr. Pogue r s comparison does not include costs by
tank trucks. The available data on this particular type of
transportation does not give a fair average cost. Tank trucks
are used largely for local deliveries, which results in an
extremely high ton-cost for these short hauls. In order to
(1) Pogue, James E.
,
"Economics of the Petroleum Industry",
Chase National Bank of the City of New York, March
1939, p 27
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make a fair comparison of tank truck costs consideration
must be given to the length of haul, the number of stops,
and the condition of the route traveled. A recent study of
tank truck operations, made by the Washington State Depart-
ment of Public Service, reveals costs of owner operations
varying from less than three cents per ton-mile on hauls of
100 miles or more to more than five cents per ton-mile or
very short hauls. (1) Reports were also made which indi-
cated that some operators were able to come below these costa.
The most recent statistics I have found available
are the ones given by Paul Reed in his article, "Pipe Lines
Will Compete With Ocean Tankers", in the January 7, 1943 is-
sue of the Oil and Gas Journal. (2) In this discussion Mr.
Reed states that peace time transportation costs by tankers
from the Gulf Coast to New York average about 22 cents per
barrel. Railroad freight rates for the same distance are
about #1.70 cents per barrel. Although Mr. Reed does not
give any definite statistics on pipe line transportation costs,
in comparison to Mr. Pogue’s figures, it would seem that they
would be between 40 and 60 cents per barrel.
Of course, the cost of any individual means fluc-
tuates with the percentage of capacity at which the system is
operated* In order for pipe lines to come any where near
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National ISoonomic Committee",
1942, p 318
(2) Reed, Paul, "Pipe Lines Will Compete With Ocean Tankers",
Oil and Gas Journal, January 7, 1943, pages 58 - 77
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tank vessels in transportation costs they mast he operated
at 100$ capacity at all times.
To summarize this data, it is evident that rail
costs are much higher than pipe lines and pipe lines higher
than tank vessels. Tank tracks compare to railroads in cost.
Because of these variances in cost, petroleum will not travel
by rail where pipe line facilities are available, and will
not travel by pipe line, where it is possible to utilize tank
vessels.
Although tank trucks seem to be of little importance
they probably are showing the greatest competitive development.
They are expanding their radius of movement and because of
their extreme flexibility continue to offer increasing
competition.
3. War Time Transportation
1, Need For Transportation Of Petroleum Products
The transportation of petroleum products assumed a
vital importance when the nations of the world became locked
in a struggle for survival. The victor in this gigantic
struggle will be the nation or nations who have the greatest
supplies of natural resources from which the methods of war
may be devised. Of these natural resources, petroleum is one
of the most important. It's importance is realized when we
realize that almost every type of weapon we use today is pro-
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polled by petroleum products. Airplanes, ships, submarines,
mechanized artillery, tanks, trucks and many other implements
of warfare depend upon the petroleum industry for their ef-
fective operation.
However, for the Allies, it is not the problem of
adequate supplies of petroleum as it is with the Axis. The
Allies, in relation to petroleum products, have always been
the "haves* and the Axis the "have nots". Our most severe
problem is that of transporting the supplies to points of use-
ful consumption.
The seriousness of this condition can be realized
when we see that the Western Hemisphere lost about 125,000,000
barrels of petroleum in 1942 due to the lack in transportation
facilities. (1)
This loss resulted when it became necessary to cur-
tail crude oil production because of lack of shipping facil-
ities. Of course, this condition has its most serious effect
upon our war effort but it also has an effect upon all phases
of our economic life. When orude production is curtailed,
the income of the orude oil producer is lowered along with
that of the refiner, the marketer, and the civilian consumer
whose business depends upon his ability to secure petroleum
products to propel his tools of livelihood.
In the United States alone, this problem has become
(1) O'Donnell, J. D. "Reduction In Oil production Is Caused
Entirely by Warfare", Oil and oas Journal, December 31,
1942, pages 42-43
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serious. Since the United States produces about 63$ of the
Allies 1 total crude petroleum, the problem of transporting it
to our own forces scattered around the globe, as well as
supplying the armed forces of our Allies, becomes a sizeable
one
, ( 1
)
Some sources of supply were rendered useless with
certain military accomplishments of the Axis. When the
Japanese secured control of the Netherland East Indies,
Australia was no longer able to secure supplies from this
near-by source. Supplies had to be secured from Abadon or
from California, making it necessary for the Allies to in-
crease their number of tankers on these runs two and even
three times.
Britain’s petroleum situation has also put a great
strain on the United States’ tanker fleet. Under peace-time
conditions Britain produces little or no oil. It is neces-
sary for her to import the bulk of her consumotion. Early in
1942 it was discovered, due to incorrect estimates, that
Britain's inventories of petroleum were far below the safe
level. Fifty tankers were immediately supplied by the United
States to rebuild their stocks and once again our petroleum
transportation system received a shock.
Here in the States our problem is concerned with
making the crude available to the refineries.
Our principal gas and oil reserves are in the Gulf
*
(1) Life, "World Oil Guides The War", May 18, 1942, pages
58-59
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Coast and the refineries on the East Coast. This in reality
comprises a single area with the Gulf Coast as producer and
the East Coast as the principal refiner. During peace times
about 95% of the oil consumed along the East Coast was brought
by tankers.
Our peace time tanker fleet was adequate for peace
time consumption but not for war. About a year and a half ago
the owners of the American tankers were called upon to assign
a substantial portion of their tanker tonnage for services
which were necessary to rebuild the level of oil stocks in the
United Kingdom. If this had been a temporary assignment our
transportation system would not have suffered too greatly.
However, soon after this the seoond call for more tankers came.
The removal of these tankers oaused such a shortage in our
domestic transportation facilities that the unified action
within the oil industry became necessary.
2. Contribution Of Railroads To A Satisfactory Solution
The first attempted solution was to develop every
means possible to move oil overland and by inland water routes.
However, it was not easy to accomplish this change as quickly
as it was necessary. The industry realized that there may
never be more tankers available for the East Coast since the
army and navy would probably be needing them elsewhere. In
addition to this, the human element was also considered. It
did not seem ethical to ask seamen to give their lives to get
non-essential or even essential oil to the East Coast, if other
means could be utilized.
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Therefore, the railroads are called upon, as the
most adequately developed overland route, to transport larger
quantities of petroleum. The railroads responded remarkably
and in July 1942 were transporting over nine times as much
petroleum as they were at the time of Pearl Harbor in December
1941. Since July, even greater efforts have been made by the
railroads and this ratio has risen several more points.
To effect an improvement in the operating efficiency
of the railroads the Office of Defense Transportation has
ordered the following steps to be taken:
1. Limit shippers and receivers of traffic to four hours
loading and unloading tank cars. Require cars to be
released within total of twelve hours after delivered
as against the present permitted forty-eight hours.
2. Hold carriers wherever practicable to four hours for
switching terminating cars to the plant of the receiver,
or originating cars to plant of the shipper.
3. Assign certain tanks to Eastern petroleum service and
eventually all of the nation's 143,000 cars to specific
services.
4. Require immediate repair of defective cars by the car-
riers or agents without regard to the ownership of the
cars
.
5. Obtain an inventory of the available transportation,
loading and unloading facilities and day to day informa-
tion about operation of symbol petroleum trains,
6. Continue tank car permit system, simplified to require
special or general permit for movement of any commodity
in tank cars for a distance of less than 200 miles,
as measured by the shortest available public railway
traffic route.
7. Require the participating carriers to assemble and dis-
patch a symbol train (1) within ten hours after received
or tendered, thirty or more cars destined to suitable
concentrated points, and (2) within fifteen hours after
there has been tendered to it a trainload of cars so
destined. (1)
(1) Oil and Gas Journal, "Higher Delivery Goal Set By
Railroads And Oil Shippers", December 17, 1942, p 27
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As a result of this program the railroads have in-
creased their deliveries from 60,000 barrels daily in 1940
to an average of 800,000 barrels daily in late 1942. fl)
In the early part of 1942 the railroads estimated
that they could step their transportation of petroleum up to
600,000 barrels a day. By May of 1942, they were already
moving some 600,000 barrels a day and have since advanced to
the figure quoted above. However, the railroads are limited
by lack of tank oars. It takes essential quantities of steel
to construct new tanks and also considerable time and money.
The railroads have tried various other means to in-
crease their capacity for carrying petroleum without increas-
ing their own rolling stock of tank cars and without requir-
ing the petroleum industry itself to supply their cars. The
most recent of these ventures and ones that seem to have pos-
sibilities for success are the conversion of box cars, cement
carriers, and gondolas into the transportation of oil.
The cement carriers are usually sixty-foot flat cars
with portable containers fitted to the top to carry the cement.
There are drop-backs and other arrangements for quick unload-
ing. To fit them for carrying petroleum products the orig-
inal containers are removed. In their place, are five light
steel tanks. Bach of these converted carriers has a capacity
of about 8,600 gallons, 400 gallons less than the average reg-
ular tank car.
(1) Business Week, "Bing Inch Grows", November 7, 1942, p 20
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The gondolas are simply flat cars with sides a few
feet high. Steel tanks are attached to them also. They have
approximately the same capacity.
In the conversion of box-cars "balloons" play an
important part. The balloons are of canvas, processed with
one of the new synthetic rubbers which resists the corrosion
action of petroleum products. Natural rubber does not.
These balloons are placed in the converted cars
provided with special suooorts and filled from the top. As
they fill, they expand, fitting neatly into place. Pilled,
each converted car will have a capacity of about 10,000 gallons,
A distinct advantage of this type of conversion is that after
the oil has been removed, the balloon can be collapsed and
stored in one end of the car, leaving the remainder of the
car available for other freight on the return trip.
Thus the railroads are extending every possible
means to increase their capacity and keep a check on expensive
;
expansion which would doubtless have an effect in post-war
conditions.
3 , Increase In Operating Pipe Lines
The second step that has been taken in rechanneling
the transportation of oil is the development of a more exten-
V
sive use of pipe lines. Before this national emergency, pipe
lines were used more or less locally and as a means of getting
petroleum to tanker fleets, and of course to the refiner. Now
they are faced with the prospect of transporting the oil across
the continent
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At the end of 1940 we had some 126,000 miles of
pipe in existence, (1) However, the lines which carried
petroleum across the nation were not of adequate capacity
for the demands that were made upon them under our war-time
economy.
New lines were not developed as rapidly as should
have been because of the amount of vital war materials that
go into their construction. The pipe line companies did what
they could by digging up abandoned lines and relaying them
wherever they would be of the most value.
Harold L. Ickes started a crusade for additional
pipe lines early in 1941 but was turned down again and again
because of the high cost of such a venture, the shortage of
necessary materials, and the inability of some of our govern-
ment heads to see the pressing need for such a development.
However, in June, 1942, at least a year late, the government
gave the order to start the pipe line, which Ickes had pro-
posed. This proposal had been a line from Longview, Texas,
to the East Coast, a distance of some 1580 miles.
Ickes won his battle when a transfer of 300 tankers
to other war services, combined with the East Coast submarine
sinkings of tankers, had resulted in a decrease in delivery
to the Eastern seaboard of 2,000,000 barrels weekly. (2)
The shortage of materials, that was used as the
argument, was abandoned, when it was estimated that the steel
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Pacts and Fig-
ures", 1941, p 124
(2) Time, "Heat For The East", June 22, 1942, p 17
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tonnage lost by sinkings of tankers would be more than it
would be required to construct two lines of the type proposed*
This "Big Inch", as it has been nicknamed by the in-
dustry, is a 24 inch pipe line from Longview, Texas, to Norris
City, Illinois, a distance of some 731 miles and then a small-
er line for the remaining 857 miles to the Bast Coast* When
this line is completed it will have a full operating capacity
of about 300,000 barrels of oil daily to the East Coast, which
is equivalent to the average daily delivery capacity of 25 to
30 thousand railroad tank cars* (1) In comparison to trans-
port capacity of tankers, it will be able to deliver as much
oil as a 70 tanker fleet* (2)
When the first section of the line between Texas
and Illinois went into operation in February of 1943 it was
eliminating about 550 miles of railway haulage* It was then
necessary to move the oil by rail only from Illinois to the
East instead of from the Southwestern production centers* (3)
This will mean an additional 125,000 barrels daily
for the East, to augment the 775,000 barrel average the rail-
roads are capable of delivering. (4)
This pipe line is owned by the War Emergency Pipe-
lines, Inc. The W. B* P. has agreed to act for Defense Plant
Corporation without profit to itself or stockholders. The
(1) The Oil and Gas Journal, "W. E. P. Line, Industry’s
Largest", January 7, 1943, p 51
(2) Business Week, "Big Inch Grows", November 7, 1942, p 19-20
(3) The Oil and Gas Journal, "V/. E. P. Line Industry's
Largest", January 7, 1943, p 51
(4) Ibid, p 51
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War Emergency Pipelines, Inc, is a corporation organized by
11 oil companies doing more than 85$ of the oil business in
the United States, (1)
This new pipe line will cost approximately $95,000,000,
a venture that would not be financially possible for the oil
companies to build, and even if the capital were available it
would not be an economic development since the tanker fleet
would offer too much competition.
Howe ver, under present conditions this vital emer-
gency measure would be needed if it cost ten times as much to
build and ten times as much to operate. Our primary purpose,
now, is to move the supplies, irregardless of cost.
When peace is again regained, the "Big Inch" will
more than likely be a basic means of transporting crude oil.
During its war-time operation a high percentage of fixed
costs, etc, will be written off and the government will be
able to sell it to the petroleum industry at a figure that
will allow them to compete with the tanker fleets,
Estimates of the cost of transportation have been
made which indicate that the line will be capable of operat-
ing even more economically than tankers. At a 100$ capacity
it is estimated that crude could be moved to the East Coast
at the cost of about $,13 per barrel. Under peace time con-
ditions the most efficient tankers cost $,16 per barrel and
the average for our entire fleet was about $.22 per barrel. (2)
(1) The Oil and Gas Journal, "W. E. P. Line Indus try T s Larg-
est", January 7, 1943, p 51
(2) Reed, Paul, "Pipe Lines Will Compete With Ocean Tankers",
Oil and Gas Journal, January 7, 1943, pages 58-77
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Thus we see that World War II is having a very important ef-
fect upon the transportation system of the petroleum industry.
4. Effect Of World War II On Petroleum Industry’s Transpor-
tation System
A period of national emergency, such as we are in-
volved in at the present time, always results in the speeded
development of new and more efficient methods of operation.
Thus it is in the transportation system of the petroleum in-
dustry. Under the pressure of war demands advances have been made
in a year or two that would have taken a decade or more to
achieve during peace time conditions.
Pipe lines have been constructed that the industry
could not possibly have constructed themselves, because of
the large capital investment and the fact that it would not
be able to compete with the low cost tanker fleets.
However, since much of the cost of construction
will be written off during its war-time operation, under nor-
mal conditions the pipe lines will offer a great deal of com-
petition to the tanker fleet in the movement of crude oil
and will undoubtedly displace the railroads almost entirely
in the movement of refined products across the continent.
This will result in lowered costs of refined products to the
consumers since operation costs will be lowered,
5. Petroleum Supplies And The East Coast Consumption
Even though the railroads had increased their
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capacity from 60,000 barrels in 1940 to about 800,000 barrels
in 1942, the decline in tanker transportation more than off-
set the railway gains. By taking 300 tankers off the Gulf
Coast to East Coast route our transportation capacity was
cut by some 600,000 barrels a day. The petroleum needs for
the East Coast area have been estimated at 1,330,000 barrels
daily. The transportation facilities available were not able
to meet this demand by approximately 115,000 barrels. Because
of this it became necessary for the East to draw on reserve
stocks which dwindled rapidly.
A comparison of reserve stock on hand for the last
six months of 1942 in relation to 1940-41 figures and the
rate of decline is shown in chart number 3 on page 126.
When the percentage falls below 50$ it means a serious con-
dition of shortage, and when it falls below 40$, certain
localities must suffer because of the insufficient quantities.
In the East Coast petroleum demand figures of
1,330,000 barrels daily, consideration was also given to the
fact that 169,000 barrels daily had been chopped off East
Coast consumption by means of rationing and voluntary con-
version. The result has been that in many sections of the
East, fuel supplies have become dangerously short when trans-
portation facilities were held up even for a day. Many non-
essential consumers of petroleum have been eliminated and
instead of gasless Sundays, as was seen during World War I,
we have witnessed the elimination of all pleasure driving
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and the redaction of allotments of fuel oils to the barest
minimum that allows for any degree of physical comfort.
The "Big Inch" did not come into operation soon
enough to alleviate the situation for the winter of 1941-1942.
With the beginning of its operation in 1943 the Bast may have
substantial reserves built up which will carry them through
next winter. The North Africa campaign may have a dire ef-
fect upon our reserves, since it is possible that all the
300.000 barrels the pipe line will be capable of delivering
may go directly to Africa. Civilian needs are secondary to
these demands, of course, and if we cannot build up reserves
we will have to weather another winter, the same as we did
this one. Some relief will be evident though because of the
lesson that was learned this winter by those who failed to
convert to some other means of heating. Conversion should be
more general by next year and this will allow an accumulation
of larger reserves.
The present condition begins to brighten when we
Jfcnow that plans are now under way for the construction of an-
other pipe line, a 20 inch line from Beaumont-Huston, Texas
to Seymour, Indiana a distance of 836 miles. Steel for this
it
line was alloted on January 27, 1943 and/is estimated that
164.000 tons will be needed. (1)
This line will be owned and operated in the same
manner as the "Big Inch" and will cost about $44 million.
(1) Oil and Gas Journal, "Steel Allocated for New 20-inoh
Products Pipe Line", January 28, 1943, p 55
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It is estimated that with its completion in September of 1943
a net increase of 110,000 barrels of petroleum products will
be transported daily into the Atlantic seaboard area. (1)
There has been some pressure to have this line ex-
tended from Seymour, Indiana to the New York-Philadelphia
area, a distance of 676 miles. Although the final decision
will not be made until May of this year, it will in all prob-
ability be approved and construction started on it as soon as
the first leg is completed.
In addition to this immense plan of pipe line build-
ing tankers are also being turned out at a rapid rate. Since
the majority of these will be used for foreign export, it
will not tend to relieve the East Coast situation. Sixty-two
tankers were completed in 1942, which represented an increase
of 120 per cent of our 1941 production figures. (2) The
1943 schedule is even more remarkable, with the industry hop-
ing to complete 271 more tankers which represents a 300% in-
crease over 1942 and 900 per cent increase over 1941. (3)
The latest development which will have a profound
effect upon the Bast Coast oil supplies is the possible com-
pletion of the Barge Canal system. This system is in oper-
ation between Corpus Christi, Texas and the neck of the Flor-
ida Peninsula. There still remains about 93 miles to be cut
(1) Oil and Gas Journal, "Steel Allocated for New 20- Inch
Products Pipe Line", January 28, 1943, p 55
(2) O'Donnel, J. P. "Tanker Program Dwarfs Previous Build-
ing Effects", Oil and Gas Journal, January 28, 1943
(3) Ibid
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in order to connect the Barge Canal system to the great In-
land Waterway which is complete to Trenton, New Jersey. When
this cut is made it will he possible to move oil by barge on
inland waterways from Corpus Christ!, Texas to Trenton, New
Jersey.
According to estimates that have been submitted by
various construction companies it would be possible to com-
plete this cut in about 10 months and would cost in the neigh-
borhood of $44 million.
There would be practically no limit to the amount
of oil that could be moved over this canal system once it is
completed. Wooden barges can be built in great numbers and
inexpensively. They would be safe from enemy attacks because
of the improbability of submarines entering the canal. This
system seems to be very necessary for the maintenance of Sast
Coast supplies and as an aid to supplying our forces in Africa
and Europe
.
Congress approved the measure about six months ago,
but as yet nothing has been accomplished since no appropri-
ation has been made.
If this system is completed and put into operation
during the present emergency, it will likely continue in the
future as an economical means of conveying the crude.
We can see that the transportation facilities of
the industry are expanding to keep pace with the increased
war demands. But how will the post-war conditions be affected
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by this expansion?
F. Conclusion
It means that we will have a very highly developed
system of overland transportation, owned and operated by the
petroleum industry, that will cut post-war transportation
costs to even lower levels than were attained before the war.
The industry will be more self-sufficient than ever because
it will not be dependent upon outside facilities, such as
railroads, to move their products.
World War II has given the industry a tremendous
boost. Under peace time conditions it would have taken years
to build the pipe lines, that are now being constructed under
government supervision and financial aid in a few months.
The railroads will still be utilized for short hauls but the
main facilities will be pipe lines, barges, tankers and trucks.
Reduction in transportation costs will benefit the consuming
public since it will undoubtedly be passed on in decreased
retail prioes.
If it were not for this delicately coordinated, ef-
ficient and inexpensive transportation system which has been
so largely responsible for the cheapness of petroleum prod-
ucts,
. automobiles might easily become, once more, a luxury,
ultimately reducing them to a fraction of the number now In
use. In regard to the war effort it is almost impossible to
imagine the consequences if the industry had not been as far
along in the development of transportation facilities which
conquer the hazards of our shipping facilities.
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Although increasing efficiencies in the operation of the
petroleum industry have reduced retail prices during the
past 25 years, these decreases have "been hidden, in part,
by increasing taxes which have been levied by the various
governmental bodies upon the refined petroleum products,
i
The theory, type and extent of these taxes are discussed in
the section Petroleum Industry and Taxation.
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V. P3TR0LBUM INDUSTRY AND TAXATION
A. Historical Background
1. Introduction
Petroleum, as an industry, is subject to all the
various local, state and federal taxes, that are imposed up-
on every industry and individual in the United States. In
addition to these taxes, the various products of the industry,
especially gasoline and lubricating oils, have been subjected
to a new type of tax, namely, a sales tax on each gallon of
gasoline and every quart of oil sold for consumption on our
nation’s highways.
2. Theory Of Petroleum Products Taxes
The original purpose of this tax, when it was in-
troduced by the State of Oregon in 1919, was to secure funds
for the construction and maintenance of highways. It seemed
fair and logical that petroleum products should be taxed since
it was through their consumption that the roads were being
used •
3. Spread Of Popularity Of Petroleum Taxation
The use of petroleum products as a source of reve-
nue, was soon adopted by other states and within ten years
after the passage of the original act, every state in the
Union had accepted its usage. v Increasing rates of tax also
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came with the increased usage. The tax imposed by Oregon
was one cent per gallon. By 1938 the rates had increased to
as high as seven cents per gallon in some states, and the av-
erage tax per gallon of gasoline for the entire United States
was four cents. The rates of gasoliue taxes per gallon by
states as of 1938 are shown on the following table.
Table 16
Gasoline-Tax Rates By States
(As of 1938, in Gents per Gallon)
Alabama . • • • • 6 Nebraska •
Arizona . • • • • 5 Nevada
Arkansas. • • • • New Hampshire
California . • • • • 3 New Jersey
Colorado. • • • • 4 New Mexico
Connecticut
.
• • • • 3 New York .
Delaware. • • • • 4 North Carolina
District of Columbia. • 2 North Dakota.
Florida . • • • • 7 Ohio
Georgia . • • • • 6 Oklahoma •
Idaho • • » • 5 Oregon
Illinois. • w • * 3 Pennsylvania.
Indiana • • • • • 4 Rhode Island.
Iowa • • • • 3 South Carolina
Kansas • • • • 3 South Dakota
Kentucky. • • • • 5 Tennessee
Louisiana • • • • 7 Texas
Maine • • • • 4 Utah
Maryland
.
* • • • 4 Vermont
Massachusetts • • • • 3 Virginia
Michigan. • • • • 3 Washington
Minnesota • • • 4 West Virginia
Mississippi. • • • • 6 Wisconsin
Missouri. • • • • • 2 Wyoming
Montana . • • • • 5
Source; Crawford
> B'inla, G* "Motor Fuel Taxation
States", published by author 1939, p 10
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B. Tax Levying Bodies
r?
1. State Taxes
The tax on petroleum products was initiated by the
state governments and has provided an increasing source of
revenue for them. The amount of this increase can be seen
by comparing collection statistics for 1927 and 1938. In
1927 about #1, 000,000 per year was delivered to the state
treasuries from petroleum taxes. By 1938 this amount had in-
creased about 700$ to $762,000,000 and by 1941 state collec-
tions had risen to $950,000,000. (1)
The states have not been allowed to hold this source
of revenue exclusively. In 1932 the federal government came
into the petroleum tax field by levying a one cent per gallon
tax on gasoline and four cents per gallon on lubricating oils.
2. Federal Taxes
There was a great deal of litigation as to the consti-
tutionality of the federal tax, since the federal government
was invading a source of revenue that was the inherent right
of the states to tap as they saw fit. The states were charged
with the responsibility of building and maintaining highways
and had chosen the petroleum tax as the means of securing the
necessary funds. The federal tax was not levied with the pur-
pose of securing road building funds, but as a temporary means
(1) Crawford, Finla G. "Motor Fuel Taxation in the United
States”, Published by author, 1939, p 7
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of securing needed revenue during the depression years. There-
fore, this new tax violated the theory of petroleum taxation.
When the tax was levied the federal government prom-
ised the states and the industry to abandon the gasoline tax
when the federal revenue returned to its pre-depression level.
This level had been reached by the end of 1935 but the govern-
ment failed to abandon the tax as had been promised. Instead
it continued at its original rate, and in 1940 was increased
another one-half cent as an emergency measure to aid in the
financing of the defense expansion program. In 1941 this par-
ticular tax on gasoline brought #330,300,000 into the Federal
Treasury, and the tax on lubricating oil netted #23,600,000. (1)
3. Municipal Gasoline Taxes
The rapid increase in population of cities within
the past few decades and resulting additional expenditures
for services has prompted municipalities to search for new
sources of revenue. Municipal gasoline taxes constitute one
of these new sources of revenue. In seven states the munici-
palities are now permitted by special constitutional or legal
privileges to levy such taxes. (2)
The reason for this tax was to secure revenue for
the construction and maintenance of streets. As with the state
fl) American Petroleum Industries Committee, "Automotive Tax-
ation", Tax ISconomics Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 4, July
1942, p 18
(2) Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, and Wyoming
4.
,
•
•
••
’ « <
*ZQ". QJW
.
• .
e
'
:
-tit kefsiioXv
.
...
.
«
V l' ' :•! f t . f. ..
,
' •*
'
•-
:. ;
*
< t
.
• it
'
'
:i.<
«
y. .
,
4 rv v <• s. Bl.r.vi -1
:
«
• n «.•!.-
,
.
.
137
gasoline taxes, not all of these funds were used for the pur-
pose they were originally intended#
Experience with the municipal gasoline taxes in
these seven states emphasizes their unproductive nature as
sources of revenue. The cost of administration of the local
gasoline taxes is disproportionate to the amount of revenue
produced# In addition, these taxes have a dire effect upon
the petroleum business carried on in these cities. The fact
that the taxes were not universal led to widespread gasoline
tax evasion and bootlegging of gasoline which administrative
officials find themselves unable to check.
The result is one of the most objectionable and
most onerous forms of multiple and conflicting taxation. Such
pyramiding of taxes reduces the revenue yield of all govern-
mental jurisdictions: the state, the counties, and the
municipalities.
C. Other Types Of Taxes
In addition to the two general types of taxes im-
posed upon petroleum products, there are many more which are
not as high but which act as an important source of revenue
for the levying bodies.
Two of the most outstanding of these taxes, which
have come into existence within the last ten years, are the
sales tax and the chain store tax.
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1. Chain Store Taxes
Chain store taxes were not originally intended to
apply to gasoline filling stations. They were designed to
protect small merchants from competition by "chains".
When filling stations began to be operated by inte-
grated oil companies they were classified as chains and sub-
jected to the tax. The oil companies object to this type of
taxation because they feel it places an undue hardship on
company owned stations. They claim that a company owned sta-
tion, has no great advantage over privately owned stations
since it is possible to buy one tank car of gasoline for with-
in 0*1 cent per gallon of the price of several hundred cars. (1)
The chain store tax has tended to discourage the
owning and operating of retail stations by large companies.
As far as the consumer is concerned this does not result in
any particular advantage to him since a large percentage of
privately owned retail outlets are company controlled through
leases and other contract arrangements.
2. Sales Taxes
The collection of sales taxes on petroleum products
is economically unsound, because gasoline taxes paid on the
average gallon of gasoline sold in this country are equivalent
to a sales tax of 40 per cent, and the federal tax on lubri-
cating oil also often amounts to a sales tax of 40 per cent.
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum Indus-
try", p 173, 1935
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An additional sales tax of 2 per cent or 3 per cent simply
serves to add to the already heavy tax "burden borne by these
products •
The majority of the states which have sales taxes
have realized this and have exempted sales of gasoline, either
wholly or partially*
3. Miscellaneous Taxes
In addition to these four main types of taxes there
are about 70 or more which are levied on the oil industry alone.
Some of these are excise taxes on transportation facilities,
import duties on various products, business licenses, permits
and taxes, petroleum inspection taxes, marine licenses and
taxes, and gasoline pump taxes*
D. Petroleum Industry As A Tax Collector
1. Methods Of Collection
The methods of collecting petroleum taxes vary with
the levying body and the type of tax. In most instances, it
seems that the collection burden falls upon the representatives
of the petroleum industry.
This is especially true with the collection of the
taxes imposed upon gasoline and lubricating oils. These taxes
are collected from the consumer in the forms of increased re-
tail prices. State and municipal taxes are collected by the
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marketing representatives of the petroleum industry. '-3very
local gas station, garage, and hulk station operator acts as
a collection agent and performs the service gratis. The op-
erators are forced to keep accurate records of gasoline sales
per month and make the remittance to the levying body on the
basis of sales.
The federal tax is also collected by a representative
of the petroleum industry, the refiner. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue requires the tax to be paid at this point of concen-
tration. Of course the tax is passed on to the consumer in the
form of higher prices but the federal tax has been collected
before it reaches him.
The collection of taxes is only one of many services
rendered gratis by the petroleum industry. to the various tax
levying bodies. Additional services are rendered by aiding
in the curtailment of all forms of tax evasion.
B. Criticism Of Petroleum Taxes
1. State Taxes
The state taxes have not been criticized too greatly
by the petroleum industry nor the public. The tax is quite
high, but it has been paid along with the retail price and
this is not so evident to the consumer. One criticism is
that it is not based upon ability to pay. It is paid by rich
and poor alike and since the majority of car owners are in
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the lower brackets, it is paid by the low income group. An-
other point of contention is the fact that the moneys col-
lected are not always used as they were originally intended.
This is the problem of diversion and is discussed in greater
detail in another paragraph. (1)
2. Federal Taxes
Federal and municipal taxes have been viewed with
much disfavor by the petroleum industry and the state govern-
ments. The consuming public is generally unaware of the ex-
istence of the tax. The main objections to these taxes are
that it adds another tax to gasoline, which is already heavily
taxed by state governments; the gasoline tax is an essential
part of the state revenue system; and such a tax violates
the original theory and purpose of petroleum taxation.
3. Conclusion
These criticisms are all just and it seems probable
that agitation by the interested bodies may cause the federal
government to keep their taxes at the original one cent rate
or even decrease the rate. This decrease will not be seen
during the present emergency. The nation needs every dollar
it can secure in order to finance the war. Municipal taxation
is not a serious problem since it is state controlled and can
be eliminated at the discretion of the state governments.
(1) See page 147
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F. Importance As A Source Of Revenue
The importance of the petroleum tax as a source of
revenue can be seen from the following table which shows the
total collections from all types of petroleum taxes from 1931
to 1941.
Table 17
Petroleum Tax Bill
(1931-1941)
1931 $ 684,777,000 1937 $1,315,478,000
1932 747,097,000 1938 1,286,114,000
1933 1,004,824,000 1939 1,354,166,000
1934 1,046,149,000 1940 1,523,693,000
1933
1936
1.121.936.000
1.183.147.000
1941 1,825,000,000
Source
:
American Petroleum Industries Committee
,
"Tax Eco-
nomies Bulletin”, Vol. VII. No. 3, June 1942, p 14
For each year since 1932 the total petroleum tax
bill has represented at least ten per cent of all revenues
collected from taxes in this country. (1)
The magnitude of the 1941 petroleum tax bill may be
more fully appreciated when it is realized that it is larger
than the huge annual wage disbursements of the industry and
represent more than ten per cent of the total invested cap-
ital in petroleum operations. (2)
Moreover the $1, 825, 000, 000 in taxes levied on the
(1) American Petroleum Industries Committee, "Tax Economics
Bulletin”, Vol. VII, No. 3, p 14, June 1942
(2) Ibid, p 14
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petroleum industry and its products during 1941 was approx-
imately $238,000,000 in excess of the total value of all
the crude oil produced in the United States during the year.
In other words, the taxes finally generated hy a barrel of
crude petroleum with an average value of $1.13 amounted to
#1.30. (1)
Now, that we have seen how the industry contributes
to the economic well being by providing a source of revenue,
we shall see what effect this contribution has had upon the
petroleum industry.
0. Effect Of Taxation Upon Petroleum Industry
1. Trend Of Retail Prices And Oasoline Taxes
The most noticeable effect that gasoline tax has
had is to keep the retail price of petroleum products at a
higher level. The trend since 1920 has been for a decrease
in retail price of gasoline at service stations, excluding
tax, and a marked increase in taxes. This trend can be seen
from the following table.
(1) American retroleura Industries Committee, "Tax Economics
Bulletin", Vol. VII, No. 3, June 1942, p 14
*-
'
,
*
« :
..
...
• >
.
-T*. ... iv‘* 4 .i. $ 0 . .
144
Table 18
Average Gasoline Price And Tax Per Gallon
(In Fifty Representative Cities
Compiled By The Texas Company)
Service Service
Station Station
Price Price
( Exclud- Gasoline ( Includ-
Period ing Tax) Tax ing Tax)
1920 29.74i .094 29.83/
1925 20.09 2.11 22.20
1930 16.16 3.79 19.95
1931 12.98 4.00 16.98
1932 13.30 4.63 17.93
1933 12.41 5.41 17.82
1934 13.64 5.21 18.85
1935 13.55 5.29 18.84
1936 14.10 5.35 19.45
1937 14.59 5.40 19.99
1938 14.07 5.44 19.51
1939 13.31 5.44 18.75
1940 12.75 5.66 18.41
1941 13.30 5.93 19.23
19420otober 14.38 5.97 20.35
Source
:
American Petroleum Industries Committee, "Tax Eco-
noraics Bulletin”
,
Vol . VII, No. 8, November 1942,
p 48
This table shows that the retail price of gasoline
excluding
;
tax has dropped from 29.74 cents per gallon in 1920
to 14.38 cents per gallon in October of 1942, but that taxes
had increased from .09 cents per gallon in 1920 to 5.97 cents
per gallon in 1942.
Costs of production have decreased so as to give the
consumer a more economical product but the benefits of these
savings have been reduced by increasing tax rates.
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2. Disadvantage Of High Taxes
Taxes have increased, thus increasing public re-
venue, but they have also brought with them serious effects
such as tax evasion, gasoline bootlegging, price wars, sub-
stitutions, misbranding and other unfair practices.
3. Tax Evasion
Gasoline tax evasion reduces the amount of money
available for highways. Motorists pay the gasoline tax with
the expectations that their money will be speut in improving
their roads, but if a percentage of gasoline is used tax free,
it results in a corresponding decrease in public revenue for
highway construction.
It is almost impossible to estimate the extent of
tax evasion, but it has been estimated by some to run as
high as $100,000,000 annually. (1) This evasion constitutes
a serious menace to the state in the loss of revenue; to the
automobile owner because the unscrupulous fail to bear their
share of taxation; and to the legitimate gasoline dealer when
his profits are cut by some racketeer who is able to cut
prices and undersell the market because he has failed to pay
his fair share of the tax.
The chief methods of tax evasion are five in num-
ber: fraudulent refunds and exemption, blending, smuggling,
(1) Crawford, Finla G. "Motor Fuel Taxation In The United
States", Published by author, 1939, p 108
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inadequate administration, and diversion of railroad shipments.
The petroleum industry has undertaken to assist
the government in collecting the full amount of gasoline tax.
This is probably one of the few instances in the history of
taxes when the industry, whose products are subject to the
tax, actually aids in the enforecement of tax laws.
However, it is to the interest of the petroleum in-
dustry to render such a service. The system of petroleum mar-
keting is such that the evasion of taxes on as little as 5
per cent of the gasoline going into any marketing area upsets
the price structure of that market and often of surrounding
markets
.
It has been largely due to the work of the industry
and particularly of individuals and committees, that the real
extent of gasoline tax evasion has been brought to light.
Many government officials failed to appreciate its extent or
realize the financial loss it entailed.
Another practice of the petroleum industry which
was based upon a sound principle but has been subjected to
serious abuses in the past years is the system of allowing re-
funds and exemption on gasoline which is consumed in maohines
or motors not used on public highways. For example, the
tax paid on gasoline used in farm tractors is refunded to the
tax-payer upon his request on proof of purchase of the fuel.
The evasion and abuse comes when individuals or
companies secure the refund and then use the fuel on the high-
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ways* This type of evasion is very hard to check since the
checkers do not possess any actual evidence that the tax has
been paid on the gasoline in an automobile or truck tank, or
whether it is from an exempt source. It is really up to the
conscience of the motorist to pay his proportionate share of
the tax so that his rightful burden will not be shifted to
someone else.
4. Methods Of Checking Tax Bvasion
The methods of checking all tax evasion which have
been adopted by the industry and governmental agencies are:
1. investigation, 2. thorough auditing of accounts, 3. amend-
ed and strengthened legislation, 4. eternal vigilance. These
four methods are by no means 100 per cent effective but they
have served to stem the tide of tax evasion.
H. Diversion Of Tax Funds
1. Definition
Diversion of gasoline tax funds is the name given
to the practice of states to use increasing percentages of
funds collected from gasoline taxes for purposes other than
the construction and maintenance of public roads, streets
and highways.
2 . Opinion Of Industry And Tax Collection Bodies
It is this practice that has been the main point of
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contention of the petroleum industry, while the funds were
used as originally planned the industry did not object to in-
creasing rates of taxation. The increasing rates meant an
even better highway system which was for the economic and
social well being of the nation.
Some authorities on public finance do not admit that
diversion constitutes a problem. (1) They consider the tax
as an accepted source of public revenue and as such should be
used wherever the need is the most pressing.
3. Trend Of Diversion
This attitude has resulted in the practice of using
specially ear-marked highway funds for various other purposes.
This trend began to a small extent soon after the tax was
adopted but was not extremely serious. During the depression
years state revenues declined rapidly and expenses increased
with new costs of public relief, to offset the decline in re-
venue increasing amounts of gasoline tax funds were diverted
to other uses, rublic officials found that during the depres-
sion the demand for gasoline did not shrink with increased tax
rates. The tax seemed foolproof: the costs of collection
were low, and the tax was paid as a part of the price of gas-
oline. This trend of diversion of gasoline taxes to other
purposes other than highway construction and maintenance from
(1) Crawford, Finla G. "Motor Fuel Taxation In The United
States", Published by author, 1939, p 68
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1927 to 1941 is shown in this chart.
Chart 4
Trend Of Diversion Of Tax Funds
(1927 to 1941)
Source: Prepared by author from, American Petroleum In-
dustry, "Petroleum Facts and Figures", Seventh
Edition, 1941, p 170
Crawford, Finla G. "Motor Fuel Taxation in 17. S."
Crawford, Finla G. Syracuse, New York 1939, p 69
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In dollars this chart represents an increase of
diverted funds from $5,300,000 in 1927 to $215,000,000 in
1941. The dollar value will not conform to the percentage
since the total collections from this tax have been increas-
ing almost as rapidly as the diversions. This is illus-
trated by the diversion figures for 1940 and 1941. In 1940
$1,300,000,000 were collected from state gasoline taxes. Of
this total $196,500,000 or 14.8 per cent was diverted. (1)
In 1941 the total collections were $1,500,000 of which
$215,000,000 or 14,8 per cent was diverted. (2)
4. Effects Of Diversion
The practice of diversion is not felt so keenly
until the main source of revenue declines to the point where
it will only take care of its original purpose. This is the
position that many states are finding themselves in at the
present time. Revenues from gasoline taxes are declining
with the extension of consumer gas rationing and increased
consumption by governmental bodies. These states have the
problem seeking new sources of revenue to take the place of
the funds which had been diverted from the gasoline tax fund.
A number of states have realized the consequences
of the practice of diversion and legislation has been enacted
to prohibit them.
(1) American Petroleum Industries Committee, ’’Tax Economics
Bulletin”, Vol. VI, No. 10, January 1942, p 57
(2) Ibid, Vol. VII, No. 8, November 1942, p 42
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I. War Economy And Petroleum Taxation
1. Decline In Revenue
As we have seen the trend of petroleum taxation
has teen one of rapid increase since its origin in 1919.
Every year has been marked by new and larger increases in
revenue, both for states and the federal government. This
trend upward was stopped in 1942 when it became necessary
to curtail the consumption of petroleum products by civil-
ians in order to supply our fighting forces with all they
demand and also to ease the transportation problem that has
confronted the industry.
2. Effect Upon Various Levying Bodies
This curtailment in gasoline consumption results
in a corresponding decrease in revenue for the various tax
levying bodies. The bulk of this burden is borne by the states
since, in many states, revenues from petroleum taxes have
amounted to about 25 per cent of their revenue. (1) Since
the tax on gasoline levied by the federal government only
represented approximately 6 per cent of the total revenue
collection in 1941 the decrease caused by consumer rationing
will not have such a noticeable effect. (2) This effect
has been further minimized with the increase of one-half
cent a gallon tax in 1940. This one-half cent was levied as
(1) American Petroleum Industries Committee,, "Tax Economics
Bulletin", Vol. VII, No. 3, June 1942, p 14
(2) Ibid, p 14
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a defense measure, the proceeds to be used to aid in the
financing of the present emergency. Further increases in
this tax from one and one-half cents to two and one-half
cents per gallon has been proposed to provide additional
revenue for defeuse financing.
The full effect of consumer rationing on revenue
from petroleum products will not be felt until 1943 since the
first three quarters of 1942 showed an increase in collections
over the same period in 1941 by about twelve per cent. There
was a sharp decline in the fourth quarter which will become
more evident in 1943.
The state governments who were wise enough to dis-
tribute their tax funds as they were originally intended and
not to divert any of their funds will have very little trou-
ble in making their collections cover their expenditures.
Highway construction has been practically stopped during the
present emergency and as long as collections are adequate to
meet highway debt obligations and maintenance expenses they
will be able to weather the decline.
It is the states who did divert part of their re-
venue that have a serious problem confronting them with de-
cline in revenue from gasoline taxation. New sources of re-
venue must be developed or new distributions made from old
sources in order to meet current obligations.
3. Contribution Of Petroleum Taxes To Our National Well Being
The importance of taxes levied on petroleum pro-
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ducts in relation to national defense cannot be measured in
terms of current revenue. These taxes have made possible
the construction of one of the greatest highway systems in
existence. Our highway facilities now are proving to be of
great practical value in facilitating progress of the national
defense program.
It is particularly fortunate that the highways have
already been constructed, now that times are critical. Even
if funds were available in one lump sum at the present time,
a comparable road system could not be built soon enough to be
of any great help during the current emergency.
In addition to building roads and highways petroleum
taxes have also financed the maintenance of this highway sys-
tem. If it was not for such a program of maintenance our
highways would virtually become useless in a few years due
to natural "wear and tear”.
J. Conclusion
The petroleum industry, as a source of revenue, has
been steadily increasing in importance since the origin of
the tax on refined products in 1919. This trend has been
halted temporarily with the emergency conditions which con-
front the nation but there is every indication that it will
resume its upward climb after the war is over. There will
be larger demands for petroleum products than there are now.
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We may also see a use of funds from this source for maintenance
of airports and landing fields if the civilian population
takes to the air as the trends seem to indicate.
Irregardless of what the future holds, we have seen
the importance of the gasoline and lubricating oil taxes as a
source of revenue and how they have benefited the nation by
giving it a system of highway facilities unparalleled in the
world. This highway system is an important factor in our
present emergency since it facilitates the transportation of
vital war supplies.
However, in order to maintain this source of revenue
we must maintain adequate reserves of crude petroleum. The
importance of conservation measures to the petroleum industry
and to the economic and social welfare of the nation is dis-
cussed in the following section. This discussion inoludes
a brief analysis of the various means of conservation and
especially of proration which is the newest conservation
measure. To bring this topic as near up to date as possible,
the relation of conservation to the demands of a warring
nation are also considered. Future supplies must not be
jeopordized without adequate cause.
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VI. CONSERVATION
A. Economic Need For Conservation
1. Introduction
'
The petroleum industry, like any other industry
that is dependent upon a natural resource for its supply of
raw material, is confronted with the problem of securing and
maintaining adequate reserves. The industry, along with vari-
ous governmental agencies, realizes that oil is an irreplace-
able natural resource of limited size and that it is their
prime responsibility to avoid unnecessary wastes.
Only within the past few years has the seriousness
of the problem been fully appreciated by either the industry
or the government. The present war and its dependence upon
adequate supplies of crude and more recent analysis of eco-
nomy dependence upon crude petroleum products have increased
the need of scientific conservation. Petroleum as a natural
resource is peculiar in that it is almost impossible to pre-
dict accurately the amount of our reserves.
At the present time the nations known reserves of
orude oil are estimated at something in excess of 17,000,000,000
barrels. (1)
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee”,
1942, p 60
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Theoreotically this would indicate about 13 years
supply# (1) This outlook becomes more optimistic when we
realize that this is known reserves and not estimated pos-
sible supply# There are numerous areas which have not been
explored as yet. New discoveries in the past have almost al-
ways kept pace with consumption and reserves estimates are
revised upwards#
The rate of consumption is apparently destined to
gradually rise until at least 1960# (2) Production, on the
other hand, is a matter of diminishing returns and it would
take at least 30 years to get the present supply out of the
ground# (3) Thus, there is no immediate prospect that the
nation will suddenly wake up and find its oil vanished. But,
over a period of years, supplies will have to be drawn from
more inaccessible deposits, and increasingly elaborate methods
of extraction and utilization would have to be employed. Even
tually oil would have to be imported or distilled from oil
shale or coal# Therefore, we can see the imperative need for
the utilization of all developed deposits.
2. Definition Of Conservation
To secure a clear out understanding of conservation,
we find Webster defines it as a method of preserving or pro-
tecting# The petroleum industry has rewritten this meaning in
(1) Amerioan Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Economic Committee",
1942, p 60
(2) Ibid, p 60
(3) Ibid, p 60
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to one of its own and has defined conservation as an orderly
and efficient use in the interest of national welfare, both
in war and in peace, without unnecessary waste either of the
physical resource itself or of the human elements involved
in its extraction, (1) In other words it means that the re-
source should be drawn upon without waste and in an orderly
response to the economic needs of the country,
3. Effects Of Production Methods Prior To Conservation
The very nature of the production end of the petro-
leum industry, up to the time of government intervention and
industry regulation, made it difficult to eliminate wastes.
Production was based upon the "law of capture" which allowed
the ownership of the product to reside with the individual
bringing it under effective control.
Under the American Oil Law, in absence of statutory
legislation and control, it has appeared that an operator or
a lessee, unless the provisions of his lease provide other-
wise, may drill as many wells as he chooses, may locate these
wells wherever he chooses, may drill as promptly as he desires,
may drill the wells so as to protect his off-set from drain-
age, may continue to drill as long as there is production, may
produce his wells to capacity, may employ any means he sees
fit to produce, and moreover own all the oil or gas he can
produce regardless of whether it comes from his neighbor’s
land or not. A careful analysis of these practices will show
(1) American Petroleum Industry, "Petroleum Industry Hearings
before Temporary National Economic Committee", 1942, p 216
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that each and every one of them provides for economic wastes.
4. Sources Of Waste
Under wild cat drilling practices it was possible
for several owners to be draining the same reservoir of crude
and no regard was given to the amount of oil produced. Kvery
operator was out to secure as much as possible, regardless of
how low overproduction pushed crude oil prices.
This condition of individual greed was not the only
cause of unreasonable wastes in production. In the early twen-
ties the required rates of production to meet the increased de-
mands could not be attained by an orderly extraction of petro-
leum. It became necessary to produce as rapidly as possible,
which resulted in a sacrifice of part of the available crude
supply.
5. Types Of Waste
In the production of crude petroleum there are two
types of physical wastes. First, those that are visible above
the ground, and second, those that occur unseen in the reser-
voir. Conservation is concerned with both, of course, but
fortunately the first class, which was very prominent in the
period of rapidly expanding demand, has almost been eradicated
in the past few years. This above ground loss is spectacular
but not too serious. It occurs first, in the burning of gas
which naturally must be produced with oil, and second, with
the loss of gas which need not be produced with oil but is
done so in order to increase crude production. The second class,
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representing oil that fails to be recovered, is negative and
unspectacular, but none the less important because it is
indirect
•
6 • Economic Effect of Waste
Under the old "rule of capture” method of produc-
tion, there necessarily developed a wide production cost
range which was quite disturbing. Low per barrel costs result
during this flush period of production and higher costs there-
after. If the quantity of crude produced during this flush
period is large enough it tends to disrupt the stability of
the industry. It certainly disrupts the function of price
as a stabilizer of supply and demand. Ordinarily cost com-
petition is desirable where it is a function of efficiency,
but if low costs are attained at the expense of waste and
an aftermath of higher costs, then this competition becomes
destructive and anti-social.
This was exactly what was happening in the petro-
leum industry. Each individual operator was producing as much
as he possibly could, as rapidly as possible. This resulted
in an over-supply and the market price dropped. The problem
came, however, when the flush period was over and the cheap
crude had been stored and was being used in this period of
higher production costs. An over-supply was keeping crude
prices down; but production costs were rapidly mounting as
extraction became more difficult.
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This condition could only be remedied by further
development of the available resources* This left two de-
cisions open to the petroleum industry. It could either
operate conservatively and without waste or meet economic
demands and look upon the waste as a social cost* Unfor-
tunately the latter was chosen.
Prom the above discussion of the economic effects
of waste we see that conservation also becomes a solution to
a problem of economic stability. One of the purposes of
conservation is to provide a plan of restricting the flow
from any oil pool with regard to the economic need for the
product* By reducing the flow, the cost range is narrowed
and smoothed out, and when the cost curve is smoothed out,
the price curve is flattened*
We can see that the need for conservation is two-
fold* First, to eliminate physical wastes and second, to
aid in the economic stabilization of the petroleum industry
as a whole* The means of conservation cannot be discussed
with direct reference to the different needs since the two
are so closely related that progress In any one direction
will have a definite effect upon the other* Therefore, the
means of conservation will be discussed not as a solution to
any specific problem but as a solution to the entire problem.
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B. Methods of Conservation
1. Conservation By New Production Developments
The petroleum industry has accomplished a great
deal in the elimination of physical wastes. During the
periods of rapid production many wells were only worked as
long as the underground gas pressure would push the crude
to the surface. In other words, it was only worked during
the "gusher” stage. This resulted in tremendous underground
losses. Since the discovery of the function of natural gas
in the production of oil, these underground losses have been
cut to a minimum. Natural-gas energy has increased the re-
covery of oil from producing pools and has also made possible
the rejuvenation of supposedly exhausted areas. This is done
by injecting gas, and also air and water, into oil sands and
thereby increasing or restoring the flow by driving the oil
to the surface. The drawback of this plan of conservation
is that it is expensive and in some oil producing areas it
is impractical. It has shown such possibilities for re-
covering oil that it will be of great aid when the economic
conditions warrant its use.
Another important conservation tool has been the
development of deep drilling techniques and also other new
drilling improvements. These deeper wells have tapped oil
reservoirs at lower levels, making possible the recovery of
oil from supposedly exhausted pools and fields. In fact, the
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average depth of wells commercially reached by drill have
almost doubled in the past ten years. In 1929 the deepest
well was about 9,000 feet but in 1938 a well was drilled in
California to the depth of 15,000 feet. (1)
2. Conservation And Refining Techniques
New and better refining techniques have also in-
creased the available supply of crude petroleum by the
elimination of unnecessary waste. In this direction the
development of the "cracking process" has done more than
any other new refining development. The amount of crude
petroleum actually saved by this method can be clearly seen
from the following table.
(1) Pogue, Joseph E., "Economics of the Petroleum Industry",
The Chase National Bank of the City of New York,
March 1939, p 28
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Through the use of the cracking process the yield
of gasoline from crude has more than doubled • In addition
to this accomplishment, the quality of gasoline now available
to the public is far superior to that which could possibly be
produced by straight-run distillation*
Since 1920 the economic strength of the nation has
been increased by the conservation of 13.5 billion barrels of
crude oil by cracking operations, effecting a saving equal to
almost ten years* supply at our present rate of consumption,
which otherwise would have been needed and withdrawn from the
nation’s underground reserve to supply its gasoline demand
with straight-run gasoline*
With the aid of cracking, some superfluous products
and low-grade crudes are converted into valuable high anti-
knock gasoline, which is blended with straight-run gasoline
of low octane rating, and provides many high types of fuel
which otherwise could not have been utilized.
3. More Efficient Utilization
Further aid to conservation is seen in the develop-
ment of more efficient and effective utilization of petroleum
products. Year by year engineers increase the efficiency of
the machine, reducing fuel consumption and increasing power
output* Technologists say that complete utilization of the
power content of gasoline would make it possible for a small
motor vehicle to travel about 400 miles on one gallon of gas-
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oline. (1) If this development were possible, it would re-
duce our present gasoline consumption about 23 times. An
average motorist today drives about 10,000 miles per year and
in a small car will average 15 miles per gallon. This means
he uses about 660 gallons of gasoline per year. (2) If he
were to get 400 miles to a gallon instead of 15 he would only
use 25 gallons a year. This of course sounds fantastic, and
perhaps it is to the extreme, but it does show us the possi-
bility af conservation of available crude products without
an actual saving of the original crude itself.
These are primarily means of conservation of phys-
ical wastes, although they have their own effect upon the eco-
nomic stability of the petroleum industry. During the past
fifteen years there has developed a plan of conservation which
is based upon the restriction of production to the most effi-
cient rate and enforces ratable withdrawals among the compet-
ing operators in a pool. This plan, called proration, was
primarily intended as an economic stabilizer but has broadened
in usage to include a conservation of physioal crude as well.
4. Proration
Proration literally means the allocation of demand
among competing producers on a pro-rata basis, but the term
now carries a much broader significance for it is employed to
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "American Petroleum Indus-
try", 1935, p 89
(2) In 1939 the average automotive consumption was 655 gal-
lons of gasoline.
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describe the entire process by which the production of crude
oil in the United States is regulated. As it is now consti-
tuted, proration is a planned production measure, the purpose
of which is to prevent waste, insure ratable takings, and
balance supply and demand.
The conditions that gave rise to proration date
back to the early post-war period when the supply first began
to out-distance the demand. Previous to this time there had
been periods of overproduction but they were rather spasmodic
and usually short lived because of the ever increasing con-
sumption. As demand began to mature and the art of discovery
became more efficient, a condition of chronic overproduction
developed. For a while this condition was alleviated by the
storage of the unused production. As overproduction was not
a temporary condition, the storage facilities soon became in-
adequate and it became necessary to take steps to remove this
state of overproduction. The first steps were to curtail key
areas of production with the hope of reestablishing a balance.
This first step was local and tentative with no thought to
developing the plan in use today. When new fields came in,
the practice spread, the conservation laws of the states were
invoked and systematic organs of administration were developed
6. Administration
The proration procedure is administered by State reg
ulatory bodies through the use of the police powers of the
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State, The practioe is supported to a considerable degree
of voluntary conformance on the part of the operators, and
the Federal Government has accorded its cooperation by pro-
viding advisory quotas, circumscribing imports, checking
movements of hot oil in interstate commerce and ratifying an
Interstate Oil Compact. Sven though the State receives this
outside aid, proration is really based upon the power inher-
ent in the State governments to regulate production practices
in the interest of waste prevention. The litigation through
which the conservation laws have passed has established three
principles, as follows; the State, in the interest of protect-
ing its natural resources, may legislate against waste on
lands privately owned, the State may by legislation regulate
the correlative rights of common owners of an oil pool so as
to insure ratable withdrawals; and the State, on common-law
principles, may abate as nuisances operators that endanger
life or property. (1)
The States have sufficient power, therefore, to car-
ry out its program of modern conservation. The States more
advanced in attention to the subject have developed adequate
conservation laws and further progress is under way in the de-
veloping of new laws and the interpretation of existing laws.
As we all know, the operation of any economic sys-
tem is based upon supply and demand. Therefore in the oper-
(1) Pogue, Joseph E. "Economics of the Petroleum Industry",
The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, March
1939, p 24
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ation of proration when supplies are curtailed with an eye
to conservation, care must be exercised so that the amount
of curtailment conforms as closely as possible to the market
demand, unless of course, we are aiming at the regulation of
consuming power. Thus, it stands to reason that the system
of proration should be based upon market-demand quotas, as
it is. Just how this system of market -demand quotas operates
can be more clearly understood by the following illustration.
"In a given pool, let us say, there is a
market outlet for 30,000 barrels a day, whereas
the pool, as determined by engineering study, can
efficiently produce 60,000 barrels a day. The
regulatory authority is charged with the responsi-
bility of seeing to it that the pool does not ex-
ceed the 60,000 barrels optimum, but at the same
time must require that any smaller production be
withdrawn ratably, as an administrative matter,
therefore, the state authority feels compelled to
establish a market-demand quota for 30,000 barrels,
subject to change from month to month if the de-
mand alters as revealed at official hearings. And
once the utility of a market-demand quota is con-
ceded for the single pool, then the principle be-
comes established for the totality of pools and a
nation wide market-demand quota system comes into
existence. As a matter of fact, the allowable pro-
duction of each state and in turn for the nation
as a whole is but a summation of the allowables of
the component pools, arrived at after consideration
of the local conditions surrounding each unit. The
market-demand quota system is thus constructed from
the bottom up, instead of being imposed from the
top down, which is an important distinction; for
the system is keyed to the source where it can be
accorded flexible consideration in its manifold and
shifting parts. The application of the advisory
quotas, calculated by the T7. S. Bureau of Mines, is
that of a coordinating yardstick to permit the state
regulatory bodies to visualize in advance the prob-
able bearing of th9ir respective actions upon the
general situation. " (1)
(l) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry
Hearings before Temporary National Economic
Committee”, 1942, p 220
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In connection witn the regulation by the quota sys-
tem it is interesting to note the effect of imports upon the
system of proration, Naturally it would seem that if domes-
tic production is to be regulated, imports should be held to
a reasonable ratio to domestic production. The means of ac-
complishing these necessary restrictions are two in number,
first, the revenue aot of 1932 which placed an excise tax of
21 cents a barrel on orude and 2.5 cents on a gallon of gas-
oline. In addition to this there was a voluntary agreement
between the Secretary of the Interior and the principal im-
porting companies in 1933 to the effect that imports should
be restricted to the average for the last six months of 1932. (1)
The results are evident because of the fact that percentage
of total imports of oil to the total exports has declined
from 72.1 per cent in 1932 to 26.5 per cent in 1938. (2)
Naturally any system has its objectors, and the sys-
tem of proration is no exception. The principal objections
arise from the use of the market-demand quota system. The
most frequent objections cited are that it interferes with
the free play of supply and demand; that it is not wisely
and fairly administered and that it does not create stability.
It also offers opportunities for favoritism and abuse in ad-
ministration, but what administered system does not. Free
(1) American Petroleum Institute, "Petroleum Industry Hear-
ings before Temporary National Sconomic Committee”,
p 224
(2) Ibid, p 225
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economics is not exactly fair to all concerned.
In a just critioism of the proration system, I feel
that the economic effect it has on various factors should be
considered,
6, Bconomic Results Of Proration
During the past fifteen years the variations in the
prices of crude petroleum and also refined gasoline have con-
formed quite closely to the variations in other commodities.
From 1926, the first real beginnings of proration, to 1932
there was a general lowering of prices. There was a corres-
ponding lowering of the prices of general commodities. From
1932 on there has been a slight upward trend, but this also
conforms to the actions of commodity prices. Therefore, it
is difficult to tell exactly what influence proration has
had on prices.
The balancing of supply and demand does not in it-
self carry price beyond the equilibrium level, although it
does create circumstances under which outside forces can in-
fluence prices only for a temporary period and to a limited
degree. In a system of proration, it seems evident to me
that price is more dependent upon the economic efficiency of
producers, refiners, and retailers than it is upon forces of
supply and demand. The demand is forecast and the supply is
regulated to meet it. Therefore we should not have much of
a price fluctuation due to over or under supply. The prices
would be effected by the cost-production figures of the dif-
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ferent operators. This is one reason why petroleum figures
have tended to conform to general commodity costs. As the
commodity index rises or falls, the cost of production will
vary causing the change in crude prices.
Although the system has been criticised because
it does interfere with the practice of having prices the con-
trolling factor of supply and demand, I feel that the system
is economically sound and has had a beneficial effect upon
crude oil prices in the fact that it has tended toward sta-
bilization which is usually a healthy condition for a public
service unit, as the petroleum industry actually is, although
the fact is denied most emphatically by oil men.
Producers of oil have also felt the effects of pro-
ration in various ways. If unrestricted production had ruled
the strongly financed companies would have survived at the
expense of smaller units. They have the necessary capital
for extensive "wild cat" drilling, and in this manner would
be able to increase production considerably over the more
conservative element. The one burden borne by both large and
small producers alike, is the increased amounts of capital
which are necessary in order to finance delayed production.
The average cost for drilling and equipping an oil well in the
United States is about $19,000. (1) When it becomes nec-
(1) Sherman, Ronald B. "An Economic Survey of Petroleum
Industry", University of Oklahoma Press, 1940, p 27
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essary to operate a number of years in order to regain this
capital investment instead of a few months, under flush con-
ditions, it places a strain upon the financial stability of
producing companies and naturally affects the public in that
it becomes necessary for crude oil prices to rise in order to
pay for this long term investment,
The refining end of the petroleum industry has al-
ways been a hazardous one because of the shifting sources of
raw material supply and the relatively small margin between
crude oil prices and refined prices. Most refineries have
large investments in pipe lines and transportation facilities
so that they can always be assured adequate supplies. There-
fore it seems that the system of proration would be of aid to
the majority of refineries since there would be greater re-
coveries and a more even supply of crude. If proration is
accompanied by a decrease in the refiners margin, then the
profits of all refining units tend to suffer. Another thing
that proration has tended to do from the refinery standpoint
is to eliminate the small refineries which usually become
non-existent when the production drops down to a uniform
rate.
£roration has had no effect upon the gasoline-mar-
keting structure. The reason for this is the economic struc-
ture of the marketing system. It is so developed that its
profitability is based upon price margins instead of price
levels. The size of these margins, between wholesalers, in-
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intermediates, and retailers is determined primarily by
competition and not by the supply of crude oil. Some jobber
groups have attacked proration as the cause for declining
margins but in reality it has been the overcrowding of the
marketing field that has caused these declines.
The only effect proration seems to have upon em-
ployment is that it tends to increase it at the present.
Under this system there will be more wells producing at one
time and regardless of the size of the well, it takes a
certain number of workers to man it. However, this condition
will probably become normal again when wider well spacing
has been accomplished and fewer wells are producing the
demanded crude.
The consumer of petroleum products, Mr. Average
Citizen, is the beneficiary of proration both economically
and socially. The economic effects have been beneficial
since they have tended to keep his retail prices of petro-
leum products lower. Mr. Citizen receives his greatest
benefit from the sociological effects of conservation.
When wells were allowed to be developed under "flush” methods
of production the result was booms. These booms eventually
ended in overbuilt towns, delinquent bonds, low tax valua-
tions and merchants combining of poor business.
Under a plan of conservation, the operators can
complete their wells at lower costs, since about 75$ of the
ultimate production of a well can be secured by the natural
energy within the earth. This means that only 25$ will have
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to be pumped out under higher costs. Under the old system
of production the figures could be reversed and the state-
ment remain true
»
Merchants do not experience the influx of boomtown
competition and can plan for the future with the assurance
of serving a community that is prosperous in every respeot.
Towns and cities can go ahead and pave streets and
roads, build good schools and municipal buildings, knowing
that tax values will remain at a level that will permit them
to pay their obligations.
Thus the individual benefits more than any other
and it becomes his duty to do everything in his power to aid
the oil producer to develop wells and fields along conserv-
ative lines, rroration is the system that makes it possible
to fulfill this duty and as such it becomes worthy of uni-
fied support.
£roration was originally launched as a method of
controlling overproduction. Now, however, it is both a con-
servation measure and a production control with the trend
towards an increase in conservation functions. As I have
pointed out, although it has various shortcomings it is eco-
nomically sound and its further development is necessary
for the interests of the petroleum industry and the nation
as a whole.
7. Conservation And National Defense
If conservation was necessary before the war began
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it is definitely more necessary now during war time. As was
shown in the first part of this section, our aotual known re-
serves are theoretically adequate for about thirteen years. (1)
With the increased development of new fields that comes with
an emergency such as this the reserves will probably be re-
vised upward again.
Throughout the world the most substantial decline
in crude oil production in the history of the industry occurred
in 1942. (2) The decline in world production amounted to
about 170,225,000 barrels from the 1941 all time high of
2.227.125.000 barrels. (3) This is about a 7$ drop in pro-
duction. This drop in production was due to the destruction
of fields in certain combat zones, but in the Western Hemis-
phere the decline was due to the lack of transportation. In
the United States alone, in 1942 there was a decline of
18.682.000 barrels, from 1941. (4) Our decline was also
due primarily to the lack of transportation facilities but
we were also hampered by the shortage of steel which is ne-
cessary to carry drilling operations, and for the exploration
of new fields.
Thus under war time conditions, conservation assumes
a new position. It is necessary to conserve supplies of al-
ready produced oil as well as to conserve the unproduced. In
( 1 ) See Page 156
(2) O'Donnell, J. P. "Reduction In Oil Production Is Caused
Bntirely by Warfare", Oil and Gas Journal, December 31,
1942, p 42
(3) Ibid, p 42
(4) Ibid, p 42
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conserving the unproduced supplies the same means are employed
during war times as under conditions of world peace. Physical
wastes at the surface of producing wells are eliminated as far
S3 possible and greater attempts are made to secure every avail-
able barrel of crude oil from producing wells before they are
abandoned. This means that stripper wells are worked as long
as they produce enough crude to cover the costs of production.
To the casual observer it would seem that the sys-
tem of proration would break down under war time conditions
since it is based upon the principle of supply always being
greater than demand. However, our present condition is not
one of excessive demand in relation to supply. Our possi-
bilities and capabilities of production are greater than our
demand but our immediate problem is one of transportation.
The means of increasing our transportation facilities have
been discussed in another section of this paper so it will be
unnecessary to discuss it further, but they are of vital im-
portance in relation to our conservation program. (1) Of
course the needs of our armed forces are primary and they
must be supplied at all costs. It is not possible to supply
them with their complete needs and at the same time supply
our ordinary civilian consumption. It becomes necessary to
curtail civilian consumption and the most equitable means of
securing this is to ration according to the importance of
(1) See page 115
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various needs. In this way the supplies of petroleum which
are available for civilian consumption are distributed as
equitably as possible.
Consumer rationing will have an important effeot
upon the future of petroleum reserves. If civilians were
allowed to use as much petroleum as they wished and at the
same time the armed forces were demanding large amounts our
petroleum reserves would be depleted at a more rapid rate.
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VII. POST WAR PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
What the petroleum industry becomes after the war
depends entirely upon the demands made upon it hy the con-
sumers.
The new and improved developments of production,
refining and transportation which have resulted from the pres-
sure of war demands will undoubtedly be carried into the post-
war era and utilized as effectively by the peace time con-
sumers as they were by our military machines.
B. War Time Developments Which Will Affect Post War Industry
1. Changing Demands For grades Of Fuel
The changing demands for higher grade fuels and
new products will have to be met by the industry. The in-
crease in the use of airplanes as a means of travel and as a
freight-carrying agent will make it necessary for the indus-
try to continue to turn out higher and higher grades of
fuel. In addition to this demand the petroleum industry will
also have to be prepared to meet the demands which will be
forced upon it by the development of new car, truck, and
tractor motors* The post-war engine will be smaller, more
compact and will require a very high octane fuel and an
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efficient lubricant* The motor of tomorrow will undoubtedly
be designed to utilize 87 octane fuel or even higher. This
will mean that many changes will have to be made in refining
techniques in order to meet the demands. The war needs have
hastened the development of refining techniques which are
necessary to meet the demands for high grade fuels. Such
refining tools as catalytic cracking, catalytic alkylation,
and isomerization, dehydrogenation and hydrogenation have
been made commercially usable by war demands.
2. Butadiene From Petroleum
Another new demand which sprung up because of war
needs and which will have an important effect upon our entire
post-war economy as well as the petroleum industry, is the
process of making synthetic rubber. A petroleum product,
butadiene, is essential to the production of synthetic rubber
and a number of refineries in the United States have con-
verted their existing facilities so as to be able to make
butadiene, in the quantities necessary. If this synthetic
rubber can be made in quantities more economically and of
an equal quality to crude rubber, we will undoubtedly see each
refinery developing what it can from its crude supply and then
moving the butadiene to a central plant where it will be processed
into rubber. It remains to be seen whether such a practice
will be practical under peace-time conditions when the East
Indies crude rubber supplies will again be available for our
consumption. Natural crude rubber is the result of culti-
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vation and is not dependent upon an exhaustable raw material
such as petroleum,
3. U. S. As An Importer Of Petroleum
Another change which will have an important effect
upon the petroleum industry is the possibility of the United
States beooming a chief importer of petroleum instead of an
exporter. Our reserves are in danger of being depleted and
in order to secure supplies for our efficient refineries it
may become necessary to depend upon imports from Mexico, South
America, or other countries which have large supplies of
crude petroleum,
The trade barriers that were established in the pre-
war days have been lifted so as to allow the free importation
of petroleum products. In addition, United States has made
sizable loans to Mexico and has contributed a great deal of
human talent to develop the oil productive possibilities of
that country. We are taking steps now which will aid us in
maintaining adequate supplies of crude petroleum in the post-
war world.
4. possible Solution To Supply Problem In Addition To Imports
If our natural crude reserves do become exhausted,
in addition to imports, we can secure supplies of oil by de-
veloping s synthetic product from coal. Our coal reserves
are adequate to make such a plan feasible. In addition, there
is a possibility of securing supplies of petroleum from the
huge deposits of oil shale which we have at our disposal in
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Western United States.
Men of the petroleum industry state, with confidence,
that such transition from one source of supply to another, can
he made by the industry without any noticeable effect upon the
quality of the product or service delivered to the consumer. (1)
5. Petroleum Industry As A Post-War Bmployeer
As a creator of jobs the industry will continue as
an important factor* 7/e will probably witness a decline in
marketing units as they become adjusted to the most economic
number in relation to consumer demand. There should be an in-
crease in employment through the other three divisions of the
industry; namely
,
production, refining and transportation. The
industry will be confronted with the problem of reemploying
the men which have been drawn into the army. However, this
problem will not be as serious for the petroleum industry as
it will be for other war industries. The demand for petroleum
products stands to increase after the war instead of decreas-
ing and the demand for employees will be great enough to ab-
sorb the men returning from the armed forces.
It 3eems that the petroleum industry will be a de-
sired one from the standpoint of individuals seeking positions
which will insure them of steady employment at an above aver-
age wage.
The petroleum industry has become of increasing
(1) Hager, Dorsey, "Fundamentals Of Petroleum Industry",
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939, p 84
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Importance since its very beginning, both economically and
socially* The speed of development was accelerated by the
demands made by the nation on the industry in World War I*
The advances that resulted were carried into the post-war
period, were utilized by a civilian population and improved
upon as the need arose* World War II demands have caused
technological advances in refining, production, and trans-
portation to be accomplished in two years that may have
taken ten years or more to develop under peace times. This
accomplishment will have a definite effect upon the post-war
industry and the nation as a whole since the type or grade
of fuel, the quantity and the cost, affects every family
and business in America.
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SUMMARY
The peace-time importance of the petroleum indus-
try was derived from its ability to supply the nation with
an economical source of heat and light, and in so doing it
has further added to our national well being by providing
direct employment for over a million persons at an above
average wage and also contributed to the indirect employment
of several million others.
During war time, in addition to supplying the needs
of our regular civilian consumers, it is also supplying our
armed forces with the quantities and qualities of motor fuels,
and lubricants which are giving our air force and other
mechanized forces the edge over the Axis forces.
In order to provide these civilian and military
supplies in the quantities demanded, it has been necessary
for the industry to develop and utilize new and more effi-
cient methods of production, refining, transportation, and
marketing.
New drilling techniques have made possible the
draining of heretofore inaccessible oil fields. The costs of
production have declined through the years and the savings
have been passed on to the consumer in the form of lower
retail prices.
The refining branch of the industry has been
largely responsible for the development and wide spread use of
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the automobile since it developed the necessary fuel* Dur-
ing this World War II, the effectiveness of our fighting ma-
chine and especially our air force is the result of the pro-
duction of 100 octane fuel* The post-war world will he sup-
plied with high grade fuels and lubricants as refining tech-
niques made commercially applicable by the war are carried
into peace-time activities*
The petroleum industry has developed a transporta-
tion system tailor-made to fit its own needs and is in the
main, owned and operated by the industry* War-time strains
on the transportation system have speeded new developments
and with the aid of the government the industry has built a
cross-country pipe line and is utilizing our intercoastal
water-ways to the fullest extent. The result will be an even
more economic transportation system in the post-war world*
The marketing branch of the petroleum industry has
been subjected to the greatest criticism of any part of the
industry* It has expanded rapidly to keep pace with the in-
creasing consumer demands but it has expanded so far as to
become uneconomic. The sales of petroleum products per oper-
ator do not warrant the existence of all operators and there
is a trend back to the point of efficiency as the economic
laws are forcing the least valuable to close down.
The products of petroleum as well as the industry
itself have acted as an important source of revenue for the
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various tax levying bodies. The industry contributes over
a billion dollars annually to the various governmental treas-
uries, and as a result has built one of the largest and fin-
est highway systems in the world.
The supplies of crude petroleum are distributed
quite generally throughout the entire world. At the present
time the United States is producing about 62 per cent of the
worlds oil but this does not mean that we have more natural
reserves of crude than other countries. Our industry has
been developed to a higher degree than has the industry in
some of the other countries.
One of the major changes in the post-war industry
will be the possibility of the United States becoming a major
importer of petroleum instead of an exporter. It may also
soon become necessary for our chemists to develop a synthetic
oil or else to study means of using the oil shale deposits
in the Western United States.
Other changes will be seen in the type of product
produced and our post-war transportation system will undoubt-
edly operate more efficiently as a result of discoveries
made by the industry. The industry spends millions annually
in research on the development of new products or the reha-
bilitation of the old.
From its beginning in 1859 to the present date the
petroleum industry has occupied a position of increasing
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Importance in our highly integrated economic system. This
position of importance will undoubtedly increase after the
war as our nation tends toward a higher degree of mechaniza
tion. Regardless of the changes or developments the
flexibility of the oil industry will permit it to keep pace
with the changes and to continue to serve in the same effi-
cient matter as it has served in the past.
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